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INTRODUCTION
Congress might be passing statutes that are against the law. The
Helms-Burton Acte ("the Act") and other recent sanction legislation2
aimed at isolating rogue and terrorist-supporting nations' might
1. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114,
1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) 785 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091, 16431 and 28
U.S.C. § 1611) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].
2. Another recent example of this kind of legislation is the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) 1541 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701).
3. When describing nations, the term "rogue" entails more than evil. The Soviet Union
was the "evil empire," but it was not a rogue state. See Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Annual
Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals (Mar. 8, 1983), in Pun. PAPIERS 356, 363("When they [in the Soviet Union] preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence
over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are
the focus of evil in the modem world."). Rather, the distinguishing quality of a rogue nation
appears to be its isolation from a coalition of like-minded allies. A rogue nation is the renegade
that spurns international norms. See Princz v. F.R.G., 813 F. Supp. 22, 26 (D.D.C. 1992)
(declaring Nazi Germany a rogue nation that "neither recognized nor respected ...
international law"); see also Stephen S. Rosenfeld, The Menace of Rogue States, WASH. POST, June
7, 1996, at A23 (describing typical rogue as "single unruly state"). Former U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations Madeleine Albright's classification of the post-communist world order
reinforces this distinction: "good citizens" are countries with democratic values and free-
markets; "emerging democracies" include the former communist countries that are building
democratic institutions; "failed states" are administered by the world community; and "rogues"
act contrary to the international system of order. See Thomas L. Friedman, Cold War Without
End, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993, § 6 (Magazine), at 28. Some commentators suggest that the
term "rogue" is vacuous nomenclature engineered by the Department of Defense for its own
self-preservation. See MICHAEL KLARE, ROGUE STATES AND NUCLEAR OUTLAWS: AMERICA'S
SEARCH FOR A NEW FOREIGN POLICY 3-34 (1995) (explaining Pentagon's proposals forjustifying
defense spending in post-communist world); Friedman, supra, at 28 (describing U.S. government
officials accustomed to communist threat as searching for new guiding principles).
1997] THE HELms-BURTON ACT 1291
violate the United States' legal obligations established under custom-
ary international law and international agreements. By enacting
legislation that impinges on these international obligations, Congress
may expose the United States to liability in international tribunals4
and may allow U.S. courts to undermine congressional statutory
intentions. The latter danger arises because U.S. courts have used
both customary international norms and international agreements
6
to define the reach of domestic statutes. For example, courts may
limit the effect of these "illegal"' laws by construing them in a way
Countries included in the rogue category, and the characteristics earning them that
designation, include: Pol Pot's Cambodia and Idi Amin's Uganda, for their "virtual genocide,"
see Editorial, Rogue Regime, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1979, at A18; Castro's Cuba, for its attack on a
Bahamian patrol boat, see Editorial, Piracy, WASH. POST, May 13, 1980, at A16; Muammar
Qaddafi's Libya, for instigating unrest, supporting international terrorism, and killing political
foes, see Editorial, The Nastiest Regime Going, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1980, at A12; China, for its
interrogation of foreign journalists, see Editorial, Incident in Beijing WAsH. POST, May 19, 1992,
at A18; and Iraq, for its conduct as an aggressor state, see Editorial, Half a Policy on Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1994, at A16.
4. Such liability is the result of settled international legal norms denying the supremacy
of domestic law over international obligations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1) (b) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
International tribunals that may hear claims against the United States relating to the Helms-
Burton Act include the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and a panel of the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). Canada and Mexico have initiated the dispute resolution
process under NAFTA. See NAFIA Designates Confer on Complaint Against Helms-Burton Under
Chapter 20, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1093, 1093 (July 3, 1996) (reporting teleconference
between designates of trade ministers from each country as part of dispute resolution process
in Chapter 20 of NAFTA). Furthermore, the European Union ("EU") has asked the WTO to
name panelists to hear the EU's complaint against the Helms-Burton Act. See EUProposes Naming
Panel to Handle WFO Complaint Against Helms-Burton, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 230, 230 (Feb.
5, 1997). The United States recently indicated that it would not participate in the WTO panel
if it is appointed. See Paul Blustein & Anne Swardson, U.S. Vows to Boycott WTO Pane, WASH.
POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at Al.
5. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963)
(interpreting labor relations statute so as not to violate customary sea law); Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (determining applicability of statute based on customary sea law);
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (referring to
international doctrine of diplomatic protection to limit application of Nonintercourse Act). See
generally Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (using norms of international law to
define content of Alien Tort Statute).
6. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1982) (construing employment
discrimination statute so as not to abrogate provisions of Military Base Agreement between
United States and Phillipines).
7. "Illegal" only in the sense of international law. There is no constitutional limitation on
congressional authority to pass laws that breach international law. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 5, 13 (1957) (stating that although international law reigns supreme over federal law,
Congress is not bound to acquiesce to treaties or other instruments of international law; rather,
Congress is limited only by adherence to U.S. Constitution). Nevertheless, as discussed
throughout this Comment, constructions of domestic statutes that would violate international
law are subordinated by U.S. courts to other constructions that reconcile the statutes with
international norms. See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (describing principle of
reconciliation articulated in Charming Betsy); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4,
§ 155(a) (discussing relationship between domestic law and international law when they
conflict).
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that avoids inconsistencies between domestic and international law.8
This Comment discusses how international law9 and related principles
of statutory construction may affect the implementation of the Helms-
Burton Act.
Congress recently enacted, and President Clinton signed, the
Helms-Burton Act, officially known as the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996.10 The Act allows
any "person"" to be sued for "trafficking" in confiscated property"
belonging to U.S. nationals.'" Businesses deriving any benefit from
confiscated property in Cuba thus are exposed to large damage
claims.'4 Furthermore, the Act instructs the State Department to
deny visas to aliens who "traffic" or who are associated with "traffick-
8. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between international
and domestic law and tendency of courts to resolve contradiction through statutory construction
that favors international law).
9. See infra note 26 (explaining guidelines for international law principles used in this
Comment).
10. Pub. L. No. 104-114, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 785 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6021-6091, 16431 and 28 U.S.C. § 1611). The House Bill, H.R. 927, passed the House of
Representatives on September 21, 1995, by a vote of 294-130. See 141 CONG. REC. H9399 (daily
ed. Sept. 21, 1995). The Senate passed H.R. 927 on October 19, 1995, by a vote of 74-24. See
iL at S15,323 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1995). A conference committee was appointed by the House
and Senate. See id. at H11,807 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1995); id. at S18,639 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1995).
The Senate agreed to the conference report on March 5, 1996, by a vote of 74-22. See 142
CONG. REc. S1511 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996). The House agreed to the conference report by a
vote of 336-86. See itL at H1749 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1996). The bill was presented and signed by
the President on March 12, 1996. See i&. at H2121 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1996); id. at D192. For
discussion of the congressional votes, see John E. Yang, Cuba Sanctions Bil Clears Hi Goes to
Clinton, WASH. PosT, Mar. 7, 1996, at A30;John E. Yang, Senate Passes Bill to Discourage Investment
in Cuba, WASH. PoT, Mar. 6, 1996, at A4.
As indicated, the official name of the Act is the Cuba Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 ("libertad" is Spanish for "liberty"), but this Comment will refer to the
Act by its popular name, the Helms-Burton Act.
11. The Act defines "person" broadly to include "any person or entity, including any agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state." Helms-Burton Act § 4(11), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Star.)
at 790 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6023(11)).
12. The Act makes liable a person who "traffics" in confiscated property; that is, one who
knowingly and intentionally-
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of
confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of,
manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated
property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in clause
(i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in
clause (i) or (ii)) through another person, without the authorization of any United
States national who holds a claim to the property.
It § 4(13), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 790-91 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)).
13. The provisions creating a right of action are found in Title III of the Act. See id. §§ 301-
306, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 814-22 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081-6085). The
intricacies of this provision are discussed infra Part I.B.
14. SeeHelms-Burton Act § 302(a)(3), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 815-16 (to be codi-
fied at 22 U.S.C § 6082 (a) (3)).
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ers." 5 The United States' closest trading partners,1 6 especially
those countries with significant financial interests in Cuba,17 fear that
15. Title IV of the Act covers the exclusion of aliens who have confiscated property or
trafficked in confiscated property. "Traffic," as used in Title IV, has a different meaning than
that found in Title III. Title V defines "traffic" as follows:
[A] person "traffics" in confiscated property if that person knowingly and intefntion-
ally-
(i) (I) transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, or otherwise disposes ofconfiscated
property,
(II) purchases, receives, obtains control of, or otherwise acquires confiscated
property, or
(III) improves (other than for routine maintenance), invests in (by contribution
of funds or anything of value, other than for routine maintenance), or begins after
the date of the enactment of this Act to manage, lease, possess, use, or hold an
interest in confiscated property
(ii) enters into a commercial arrangement using or otherwise benefiting from
confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in
clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as
described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person,
without the authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the
property.
Ld. § 401(b) (2), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 823-24 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6091(b) (2)).
The conference report notes that this definition is narrower than the definition in Title III.
The committee attempted to target acts of trafficking that began on or after the date of
enactment in Title V. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 66 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 558, 581. Title IV "trafficking" also excludes the sale or abandonment of
confiscated property in order to avoid deterring divestment. See id.
This provision has been executed by the State Department. See Guidelines Implementing
Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655 (1996).
Furthermore, pursuant to these guidelines, the State Department has notified executives from
two foreign companies that they will be barred from entering the United States. See Mexican
Finn Grupo Domos Found in Violation of Helms-Burton, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1346, 1346 (Aug.
21, 1996) (describing State Department's letters to ten executives of Mexican telecommunica-
tions firm); State Dept. Tells Canadian Finn of Visa Denials Under Helms-Burton, 13 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1160, 1160 (July 17,1996) (reporting State Department's announcement that it notified
principal shareholders and executives of Canadian firm, probably Sherritt International Corp.,
that visas to enter United States would be denied).
16. The top ten U.S. trading partners in 1996, determined by the value in billions of U.S.
dollars of imports and exports combined, are: Canada (289.05), Japan (182.83), Mexico
(130.02), China (63.50), Germany (62.47), United Kingdom (59.85), South Korea (49.27),
Taiwan (48.36), Singapore (37.06), and France (33.08). See U.S. Census Bureau, Top Ten
Countries with Which the U.S. Trades (visited Mar. 1, 1997) <http://www.census.gov/
foreign-trade/www/balance.html>.
17. Spain, Canada, and Mexico lead the investment drive into Cuba in the 1990s. SeePascal
Fletcher & Stephen Fidier, Move May Not Deter Many Foreign Investors, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1996,
at 4 (discussing countries with substantial financial interests in Cuba). Companies in Spain,
France, and the United Kingdom have large operations in Cuba and, thus, may be harmed by
the Act. See id.; see also Howard Schneider, Canada and Cuba: BoomingPartners, WASH. POST, Oct.
20,1996, atAl (calling Canada Cuba's largest trading partner). The European Parliament voted
on January 18, 1996, to support closer economic ties between Cuba and the European Union
("EU"). See Parliament Approves Closer Ties with Cuba, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 4, 4 (Jan. 24,
1996).
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the Act may be applied broadly against foreign companies and have
criticized the Act as violative of U.S. international legal obligations.'
8
This Comment examines the domestic implementation of the Act
in light of its potential breaches of international customary norms or
treaty obligations. 9 This issue is important because if the Act is
enforced against foreign companies benefitting from confiscated
property in Cuba, U.S. nationals with claims to that property may
bring suit in domestic courts against those foreign entities.2" In
these cases, the defendant likely will assert that the Helms-Burton Act
should be strictly construed not to apply to foreign entities so that it
does not violate U.S. international obligations. Federal courts then
will have to examine the questions addressed in this Comment
relating to: the impact of U.S. international legal obligations on
domestic statutes;2 rules of construction for extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. laws;22 the extent to which Congress considered possible
international legal challenges to the Act; 3 and the possibility of
18. See European Commission Calls Cuba Bill "Clear" Violation of International Law, 13 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 368, 368 (Mar. 6, 1996) (reporting harsh criticism of Act from U.S. allies); see also
Victoria Brittain, Britain Defies US Sanctions on Cuba, GuARDIAN, Mar. 16, 1996, at 11 (describing
resolution passed by European Parliament denouncing Helms-Burton); Bruce Clark, Ri/kind Hits
at Cuba Trade Curb, FIN. TIMES, May 30, 1996, at 4 (summarizing British foreign secretary's
statement that "US was threatening western unity and hurting its own interests by penalizing
European companies that trade with Cuba"); Guy de Jonquieres, Brittan in Ferce Attack on US
Trade Policies, FIN. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at 4 (interpreting statements by Europe's trade
commissioner as suggesting that Act "set back global liberalization and jeopardized the
multilateral trade system");Jonathan Freedland, Cuba Trade Ban Angers UK, GUARDIAN, Mar. 13,
1996, at 2 (relating anger raised by Act in Britain, Canada, France, and European Commission);
Italy Condemns US Law on Cuba, FIN. TIMES, June 20, 1996, at 8 (reporting "Europe's strongest
warning against the Helms-Burton law" from Italian foreign minister Lamberto Dini); Zecchini
Laurent, Le Congres americain renforce l'embargo contre Cuba; La Commission de Bruxees el le Canada
protestent contre ces mesures de retorsion commerdale, LE MONDE, Mar. 8, 1996, at back page
(describing vigorous protest from European Commission and Canadian government); Berman
Simon et al., Cuba Embargoes Spark Protests, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1996, at 3 (describing Canadian
and Mexican objections to Act). The Act also has been criticized by Russia and Latin America.
See Pascal Fletcher, Russia Vows to Defy US on Links with Havana, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 1996, at 8;
Larry Rohter, Latin American Nations Rebuke U.S.for theEmbargo on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES,June 6,1996,
at A6.
19. Whether the Act violates international law is not the focus of this Comment; that task
ultimately is delegated to the judicial bodies authorized to hear claims brought in the
appropriate fora. One such forum under the North American Free Trade Agreement is
discussed in Articles 2003-2019 of that agreement. See North American Free Trade Agreement
arts. 2003-2019, 32 I.L.M. 612, 694-98 [hereinafter NAFIA] (establishing guidelines for
resolution of disputes under NAFTA and encouraging consultation of the parties in an effort
to resolve disputes or to agree on forum for dispute resolution). United States courts also are
empowered to determine and interpret international law. See generaUy RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 4, § 113(1).
20. Title III of the Act creates this cause of action. See Helms-Burton Act §§ 301-306, 1996
U.SC.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 814-22 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081-6085).
21. See infra Parts IA & II.C.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. See infra note 235.
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narrow interpretation of the statute to reconcile it with international
law.24 Because causes of action may be brought under the Act as
early as July 1997,' these questions will be pertinent to practical
aspects of real cases.
The significance of the issues raised by the Act transcends any
particular case that may be brought under it. Because the Helms-
Burton Act impinges on international agreements, it is an example of
how foreign policy sanction legislation challenges U.S. courts tojuggle
the demands made by Congress' legislative intent and those made by
Congress' prior obligations under international agreements. Absent
clear language indicating Congress' intention to abrogate earlier
agreements, courts must construe such legislation carefully to
determine the effects of the statute vis-A-vis the meaning of the
agreements. In that capacity, courts are at risk of either misreading
U.S. obligations or of misinterpreting congressional intent.
Part I of this Comment provides background relating to internation-
al law and the Helms-Burton Act. It briefly identifies the sources of
international legal norms and discusses their impact on U.S. law. Part
I also explains each section of the Helms-Burton Act, including the
complex provisions in Title III that create liability for "trafficking" in
confiscated property.
Sections A and B of Part II discuss how Title III of the Helms-
Burton Act may violate U.S. international obligations. These sections
present the strongest arguments that the Act is contrary to interna-
tional law, highlighting the principles of statutory construction
requiring U.S. courts to reconcile the Act with international norms.26
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. President Clinton has exercised his authority under the Act twice to suspend for six
months the right to bring an action under Title III of the Act. See Helms-Burton Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-114, § 306(c), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Star.) 785, 821-22 (1996) (to be codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6085(c)); see also infra note 134 (citing other sources related to President's decision).
The President has indicated that he will continue to utilize this provision every six months for
the indefinite future. See Steven Lee Myers, One Key Element in Anti-Cuba Law Postponed Again,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 4, 1997, at A6 (reporting indefinite suspension).
26. The courts may use various sources to establish international law principles, such as
those restricting extraterritorial application ofa nation's laws. SeeKadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,
238 (2d Cir. 1995) (reviewing sources that courts should consult to ascertain norms of customary
international law); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (consulting general
usages, practices, customs of nations,judicial opinions, works ofjurists, United Nations charter,
United Nations declarations, and international treaties and accords as sources of customary
international law). For the purposes of this Comment, customary international norms will be
guided by the principles established in the Restatement (Third). United States courts often have
cited to the Restatement (Third) as persuasive authority on international legal principles. See, e.g.,
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 4, § 415(g) for proposition that legal act commited in foreign state still can be subject
to U.S. antitrust laws, even when foreign state encourages act in question); Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360 (1993) (discussing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 451, which
1997] 1295
THE AMERICAN UN1VRSnTy LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1289
Section C of Part II provides a hypothetical case under the Act and
proposes three alternative judicial holdings in light of the issues
previously discussed.
Part III of this Comment recommends ways in which Congress can
avoid the risk that courts will narrowly construe statutes in ways that
may conflict with congressional intentions. The primary recommen-
dation is that lawmakers recognize the extent of both their legal
authority to shape international law through international agreements
and their legal obligation to respect the international legal principles
implemented as U.S. law. Specifically, Part III advocates the use of
statutory language included in other U.S. legislation that overtly
recognizes international legal principles as controlling the construc-
tion of such legislation. Similarly, it suggests that Congress should
express clearly the meaning of its legislation vis-a-vis international law.
These suggestions are intended to help avoid the legal quagmire
courts face when construing statutes that potentially violate interna-
tional law despite congressional assertions to the contrary.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Impact of International Law on Domestic Statutes
1. Customary international law and its impact on U.S. domestic law
Customary international law has been established by the practices
of states in their relations with one another.27 It may be understood
explains state sovereign immunity and concludes that such immunity is inapplicable when
activity in question can be carried out by private actor); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240 (observing that
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, pt. 11, notes violations of international law that are of
universal concern, "such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide"); Neely v, Club Med Management
Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 183 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that court would rely specifically on
Restatement (Third) for guidance regarding international law principles); Matter of Requested
Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on Restatement (Third) for
evidence of exception to "noninquiry rule"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2558 (1996); Yapp v. Reno,
26 F.3d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Restatement (Third) principles concerning treaty
interpretation). Nevertheless, courts are not bound by the Restatement (Third)'s conclusions
about international legal principles. In light of possible variations in international norms relied
on by U.S. courts, it should be remembered that the point of this Comment is not to establish
definitively that the Helms-Burton Act violates international law; rather, it is to present
arguments that the Act may violate international law and then to examine how domestic courts
may address these violations. For this reason, Sections A and B of Part II may appear conclusory
in nature, but they are conclusory with a purpose.
27. See generay RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 102(2) (discussing consistent state
practice constituting international law); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (4th ed. 1990)
(setting forth customs as primary source of international law); STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OFJUSTICES art. 38 (declaring custom as legitimate legal source of international law),
reprinted in RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 102 rep. n. 1. As used in this Comment, the
term "state" is used synonymously with "nation."
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as a form of common law of international conduct.28 As one source
of international law,29 customary norms form a substantive part of
U.S. law.3" For example, U.S. courts have applied customary
international law to prevent the seizure of fishing boats during war-
time," to define rights granted under the Alien Tort Act, 2 and to
construe domestic statutes.33
Despite its traditional role, the status of the authority of internation-
al customary law in U.S. domestic fora may be challenged. First,
much of customary international law does not regulate conduct in the
United States; rather, the activity regulated is that of the United States
in its relation with other countries.' Second, international custom-
ary law must yield to other sources of U.S. law, such as the Constitu-
tion 5 and federal legislation.36 Finally, courts may be hesitant to
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 111 cmt. d (likening customary practice of
states to common law in that both are thought to establish legal norms).
29. See id. § 102(1) (a) (identifying custom as a source ofinternational law). According to
the American Law Institute, other sources of international law are international agreements and
"general principles common to the major legal systems of the world." Id. § 102(1)(b)-(c). In
addition to these sources, article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice states
that the court "shall apply ... judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists ... as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICES art. 38(1), reprinted in RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4,
§ 102 rep. n. 1. The U.S. Supreme Court first discussed the appropriate sources of international
law in United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820). The Court recognized the works of
jurists, general usage and practice, and judicial decisions as authoritative sources. Id. at 160-61.
For further discussion of the ascertainment of international law by the U.S.judiciary, see Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980).
30. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (discussing evolution of customary
norms of international law and declaring that "[i]nternational law is part of our law").
31. See id. at 714 (declaring unlawful seizure of fishing vessel during military action in
Cuba).
32. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (finding torture a cognizable claim under Alien Tort
Statute).
33. See, e g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1982) (construing "treaty" as used in
employment discrimination statute as not limited to Article II treaties under U.S. Constitution
so that international agreement with Phillipines will not be breached); McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 18-21 (1963) (interpreting National Labor
Relations Act as not applying to maritime operations of foreign flagships in part so as to
reconcile statute with "well-established rule of international law"); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
571, 576-83 (1953) (limiting applicability of "any seaman" language in domestic statute in light
of international law); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,118 (1804)
(establishing that resort to statutory construction in conflict with international law is improper
"if any other possible construction remains"). See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of
International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutoty Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103 (1990)
(presenting comprehensive study of impact of international law on domestic statutory
construction).
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 111 cmt. c (noting that customary
international law often is viewed by domestic courts as lacking quality of binding law because
it regulates interests and activities outside United States).
35. See id. § 111 cmt. a (declaring supremacy of Constitution over international law for
purposes of U.S. law). Congress has entered numerous reservations to treaties stipulating their
subordination to the U.S. Constitution. For example, this kind of reservation was submitted
upon ratification of the Genocide Convention. It reads: "[N]othingin the Convention requires
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rely on customary law as a rule of decision because of the nonformal
character of customary law, the difficulty in ascertaining when and if
it has come into effect, and doubts about the justification of applying
coercive international rules that lack domestic political authority.
7
The use of international customary law by U.S. courts as a form of
statutory construction was initiated by Chief Justice John Marshall's
pronouncement in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy." Accord-
ing to the Chief Justice, domestic legislation never should "be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construc-
tion remains." 9 The Charming Betsy principle has become a canon
of statutory construction." When courts determine that internation-
al customary law is part of the law of the United States," it is
presumed that absent clear evidence to the contrary, subsequent
domestic statutes comply with that law.4" Therefore, when an appar-
ent conflict between international customary law and a domestic
statute exists, courts attempt to reconcile the two.4" This mode of
or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States prohibited by the Constitution of
the United States as interpreted by the United States." COvEYJ. OLIVER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 761 (4th ed. 1995).
36. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686 (resorting to customary international law only after
finding no legislative act that would guide decision); Shroeder v. Bissel, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D.
Conn. 1925) (holding that customary international law must bend to Congress' will); United
States ex reL Pfefer v. Bell, 248 F. 992, 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1918) (declaring that "the rules of
international law... are subject to the express acts of Congress"); see alsoRFSATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 4, § 115 (1)(a). See generalyJack M. Goldklang, Back on Board the Paquete Habana:
Resolting the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA.J. INT'L L. 143, 146-51
(1984) (arguing that customary international law never overrides statutes even if it contradicts
pre-existing statute).
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 111 rep. n. 1; Steinhardt, supra note 33, at
1108 (discussing political debate surrounding impact of international law on domestic law).
38. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
39. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 114 (codifying Charming Betsy principle);
Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 1135-82 (providing comprehensive analysis of Charming Betsy
principle as canon of statutory construction).
41. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (providing argument for and examples of
international customary law as law of United States).
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 115 cmt. a ("It is generally assumed that
Congress does not intend to repudiate an international obligation of the United States by
nullifying a rule of international law."). This principle is related intimately to a fundamental
rule of statutory construction that all parts of a statute should be read together. See 2B
SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.01 (NormanJ. Singer ed., 5th ed.
1992). A statute implicitly includes all related material, or pari materia. See id. (defining pari
materia and discussing its use for statutory construction). In this context, the Charming Betsy
principle is an argument for extending pari materia to include customary international law.
43. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963)
(interpreting labor relations statute so as not to violate customary sea law); Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (determining applicability of statute as based on customary sea law);
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118 (referring to international doctrine of diplomatic
protection to limit application of Nonintercourse Act). See generally Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 880-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (using norms of international law to define content of Alien
Tort Statute).
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construction does not signify that Congress lacks the power to violate
international obligations in enacting legislation." Rather, it suggests
that if a court can find a statutory interpretation that is in accordance
with international customary norms, it will favor that interpretation
over one contrary to those norms.
2. International agreements and their impact on U.S. domestic law
a. Types of international agreements in U.S. law
The U.S. government uses two categories of agreements to obligate
itself internationally: treaties and executive agreements." In the
eyes of international law, these two categories are indistinguishable.4"
Under U.S. law, however, there are differences between treaties and
other kinds of international agreements. The U.S. Constitution
imposes various formal requirements on treaties47 that ensure Senate
participation in the formation of international obligations. Further-
more, the Constitution explicitly recognizes treaties as the "supreme
Law of the Land."4"
Executive agreements lack this explicit constitutional formality and
authority. Executive agreements are compacts that obligate the
United States to foreign states but that, unlike treaties, are not
presented to the Senate as directed in Article II of the Constitu-
tion.49  These agreements may be congressional-executive agree-
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 115(1) (a) (stating that act of Congress may
supersede earlier rule or provision of international law provided that intent of Congress to do
so is manifest); see also infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text (discussing later-in-time
doctrine that recognizes congressional authority to nullify preexisting international obligations).
45. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 41-68 (Comm. Print
1993) [hereinafter TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS] (dividing international
agreements in U.S. law into treaties and executive agreements).
46. SeeWeinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 (1982) ("Under principles of international law,
the word [treaty] ordinarily refers to an international agreement concluded between sovereigns,
regardless of the manner in which the agreement is brought into force."); TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 45, at 41 (stating that distinction between two modes
of making international agreements has no international significance); RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 4, § 303 cmt. a (comparing United States with foreign terminology regarding
treaties).
47. The Constitution requires that the President obtain "the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, ... [and that] two thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cI. 2; see also Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 29-30 (defining "treaty" and describing
constitutional requirements for treaties).
48. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
49. SeeRESrATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 4, § 303 CmL a; Department of State Circular 175,
11 FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL § 721.2b, reprinted in TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS, supra note 45, at 303; THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 276 (2d ed. 1993). Both the Restatement (Third) and the
State Department suggest that these non-treaty international agreements be called "international
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ments, 0 treaty-executive agreements,51 or presidential-executive
agreements. 52 Whereas treaty-making was debated vigorously in the
Constitutional Congress" and is authorized explicitly in the Constitu-
tion,5 4 the origins," authority, 6  and legal status57  of executive
agreements other than treaties." Nevertheless, other sources refer to these agreements collec-
tively as executive agreements. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
201 (2d ed. 1995) ("International agreements other than treaties are generally referred to as
'executive agreements.'"); FRANCK & GLENNON, supra, at 276 (defining executive agreement as
nontreaty international agreement) ;JOHN H.JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATION-
AL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 117 (3d ed. 1995) (classifying international agreements as either
treaties or executive agreements); TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONALAGREEMENTS, supra note
45, at 51-52 (defining executive agreements as international agreements that have not been
concluded using the form of treaties). At the risk of breaching official terminology, this Com-
ment defines executive agreements as international agreements other than treaties.
50. Congressional-executive agreements are international agreements authorizedjointly by
the President and both Houses of Congress. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 303 cmL
e (describing various ways in which both Houses of Congress may authorize or require President
to conclude international agreement); TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra
note 45, at 52-59 (tracing history, discussing subject matter, and reviewing legal status of congres-
sional-executive agreements). See generally Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFIA
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995) (tracing development of congressional-executive
agreements from 1920s to present and arguing for constitutional validity of this instrument).
51. Treaty-executive agreements are made by the executive pursuant to a ratified treaty.
Because Congress either explicitly or implicitly authorized executive action during the
ratification process, treaty-executive agreements do not require further congressional consent.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 303 cmt. f (equating treaty-executive agreements with
treaties); JACKSON ET AL, supra note 49, at 118 (defining treaty-executive agreements);
Department of State Circular 175, 11 FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL § 721.2b(1) (basing executive's
authority to conclude an international agreement pursuant to treaty on prior consent by
Senate), reprinted in TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 45, at 308;
see also Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 528-29 (1957) (holding that Senate approval of Security
Treaty withJapan authorized subsequent treaty-executive agreement governingjurisdiction over
criminal offenses).
These agreements implementing ratified treaties often concern the administrative details
necessary to implement the broad language of treaties. SeeTREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS, supra note 45, at 59-60. The authority to conclude such agreements may be found
in the President's duty in the Take Care Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that
President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 176 (1972). It has been argued that this authority is distinct from the
authority referred to by the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Girard. See TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 45, at 60. Laws passed under the authority of the Take
Care Clause, however, rely on more than independent powers granted to the executive under
Article II. In fact, like treaty-executive agreements, those laws depend on congressionally
granted authority.
52. Presidential-executive agreements, also known as sole-executive agreements, are
concluded pursuant to the President's powers underArticle II ofthe Constitution. SeeTREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 45, at 60-68 (defining and explaining
"modem scope and contentious nature" of presidential-executive agreements); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 4, § 303 cmts. gj (discussing President's authority to make presidential-
executive agreements, limits on that authority, congressional role in restricting agreements, and
status of agreements as law of land).
53. See FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 49, at 272-76 (summarizing debates at Federal
Convention of 1787 concerning Treaty Clause).
54. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (describing presidential power to make treaties).
55. Compare FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 49, at 276-281 (tracing origins of executive
agreement from British practice to early practice under Constitution), With TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 45, at 51 (noting only one reference to another type
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agreements are less clear. Nonetheless, the number of executive
agreements continues to increase, especially as compared to the
number of treaties. 8 Some warn that this trend evidences a growing
concentration of power in the executive branch; 9 others flatly
declare certain aspects of executive agreements unconstitutional;"
still others applaud the practicality and ingenuity of these instru-
ments. For purposes of this Comment, these debates are less
important than the fact that courts have granted executive agreements
authority equal to treaties under federal law.62
of international agreement in Constitution as compared to four references to treaty).
56. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 303(2)-(4) (basing authority of executive
agreements on constitutional powers of Congress and President); CARTER &TRMBLE, supra note
49, at 201 (basing authority for executive agreements on treaty power in Article II, as well as on
constitutional authority granted to Congress and vested in executive); Department of State
Circular 175, 11 FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL § 721.2b (citing three sources of authority for executive
agreements: treaties, legislation, and constitutional authority of president), reprinted inTREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 45, at 303.
For the classic argument for interchangeability of treaties and congressional-executive
agreements, see Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments ofNational Sexurity, 54 YALE LJ. 181 (1945). For
a challenge to, tempered by sympathy with, the conclusions reached by McDougal and Lans and
the generation of constitutional writers on this subject that they represent, see Ackerman &
Golove, supra note 50, at 806-37.
57. The courts' treatment of executive agreements depends a great deal on the type of
agreement. See infra Part .A2.a (discussing types of executive agreements and their legal
effects).
58. See TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 45, at xxxv (charting
comparative number of treaties and executive agreements concluded by United States between
1789 and 1989); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 303 rep. n. 8 (noting that gap between
number of treaties and executive agreements continues to increase).
59. See TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 45, at xxxiv (suggest-
ing problems confronting Senate as result of growing number of executive agreements).
60. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method
in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1221, 1249-1278 (1995) (arguing for exclusivity
of Treaty Clause and criticizing proponents of congressional-executive agreements for their
broad reading of Article I power without regard to limiting provisions in Article II). At least two
of Professor Tribe's colleagues at Harvard Law School reportedly support his position. See
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 50, at 917-18 n.502 (listing Professors Richard Parker and Anne-
Marie Slaughter as subscribing to Professor Tribe's view).
61. SeeAckerman & Golove, supra note 50, at 907-16 (describing political events leading to
procedure by which Congress obtained authority to approve international agreements by simple.
majority of both Houses, praising adaptation as reflection of national consensus, and arguing
that Article I provides sufficient authority to Congress to legislate in this manner).
62. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 31 (1982) (holding that meaning of "treaty"
in § 106 of Pub. L. No. 92-129 is not limited to Art. II treaties); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 679-80 (1981) (recognizing authority of executive agreement to settle foreign claims
with Iran even though settlements were achieved historically through treaties); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (holding that executive agreements like Litvinov Assignment, a
presidentia-executive agreement between United States and Russia, are, like treaties, the law of
the land); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937) (holding that Litvinov
Assignment was international agreement not requiring participation of Congress because power
to conclude such agreements is within implied powers of executive); B. Altman & Co. v. United
States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912) (construing "treaty" in § 5 of Circuit Court of Appeals Act of
1891 to include executive agreements); Louis Wolf & Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 819, 826
(C.C.PA 1939) (interpreting term "Commercial Convention" used to describe executive
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b. Domestic legal status of international agreements
International agreements are another source of international law. 3
Therefore, they enjoy the same degree of domestic legal authority as
customary norms.' 4 They also bear similar restrictions.65 Although
international agreements are the law of the land," they are, like
customary norms, limited by the Constitution 7 and by subsequent
federal legislation.' Despite the similar status of customary law and
international agreements, it may be argued that the latter enjoy
greater judicial acceptance in the U.S. domestic legal system.69 First,
the U.S. Constitution makes treaties the "supreme Law of the
Land,"7 ° a status that courts have conferred on executive agreements
as well.71 The constitutional basis of treaties and executive agree-
ments provides a mechanism by which the political branches may
initiate, shape, and ultimately embrace or repudiate international
agreements as U.S. law.72 Second, unlike customary international
agreement as equal to "Commercial Convention" used to describe an Article II treaty).
Although equal treatment of treaties and executive agreements may be challenged in some
cases, the subtlety of the difference is beyond the scope of this Comment. See TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 45, at 65-68 (discussing reluctance of courts to
enforce presidential-executive agreements when prior congressional action has been taken).
Acknowledging the general equivalence between treaties and executive agreements, this
Comment uses the terms for the two kinds of international agreements interchangeably.
Furthermore, when the term international agreement is used, it refers to both treaties and
executive agreements unless stated otherwise.
63. SeeRESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 4, § 102(1) (b). For citation to discussion of other
sources of international law, see supra note 29.
64. For discussion of the status of customary norms in U.S. domestic law, see supra Part
IAL.
65. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (recognizing limits to impact of customary
international law on U.S. domestic law in light of contrary constitutional or legislative
provisions).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2 (including treaties as law of United States).
67. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (noting supremacy of Constitution over
treaties); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 302(2) ("No provision of an agreement
may contravene any of the prohibitions or limitations of the Constitution applicable to the
exercise of authority by the United States.").
68. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 115(1) (a) ("An act of Congress supersedes
a provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the
act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or
provision cannot be fairly reconciled."). Even though an international agreement may be
superseded as law of the United States, that agreement still binds the United States in
international law. See i& § 115(1) (b).
69. See Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 1108 (suggesting importance of written text and
constitutional origins of international agreements).
70. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
71. See supra note 62 (citing cases equating executive agreements with treaties and
conferring on both status of supreme law of the land).
72. The treaty-making process includes the following steps: initiation; appointment of
negotiators; issuance ofpowers and instructions to negotiators; negotiation; conclusion; Secretary
of State's formal submission of treaty to the President; President's transmittal to the Senate;
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norms, international agreements are documented in writing. This
allows courts to discern more easily the rights and duties these
agreements create, and to interpret73 and enforce them more
readily.
In domestic law, international agreements are similar to federal
statutes.74 This status confers on international agreements not only
the same authority under federal law that statutes possess, but also the
interpretive function that statutes serve. The courts refer to the text
of an agreement to determine the extent of U.S. obligations within
the agreement itself and to construe subsequent domestic legislation
that impinges on the international obligations imposed by the
Senate's receipt and referral to Foreign Relations Committee; committee action; conditional
approval (including reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos); committee's report
to the full Senate; consideration of resolution of ratification as recommended by the committee;
amendments to the resolution; conditional approval of the resolution (including reservations,
understandings, and other conditions); vote on the resolution for ratification; signing of an
instrument of ratification by the President; depositing or exchanging of instruments of
ratification by the Secretary of State; President's proclamation that the treaty is in force;
implementation; interpretation; settlement of international disputes; modification; suspension;
extension; termination; and congressional oversight. SeeTREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS, supra note 45, at xviii-xxvi (explaining each step of treaty-making process and
providing charts illustrating steps).
Although executive agreements lack the formalities of legislative participation that are part
of the treaty-making process, they are subject to congressional authority. See supra text
accompanying notes 49-62 (discussing ways in which Congress participates in formation of
executive agreements); see also Ackerman & Golove, supra note 50, at 916-29 (arguing for
appropriateness of participation by both Houses of Congress in formation of certain
international agreements and presenting constitutional argument for nonexclusivity of Treaty
Clause).
73. United States courts have utilized the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] to interpret U.S.
international agreements. The Vienna Convention provides standards for construing
international agreements. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191, 194
(1993); Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1994); Barr v.
U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 819 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1987); R. Griggs Group, Ltd. v. Filanto Spa, 920
F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (D. Nev. 1996); Hilario v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 165, 169 (E.D.N.Y.
1994); Cementos Anahuac del Golfo, SA v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 401, 409 (1988);
Westar Marine Servs. v. Heerema Marine Contractors, SA, 621 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 n.14 (N.D.
Cal. 1985). The Vienna Convention also has been used in domestic courts for other purposes.
SeeSiderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,714 (9th Cir. 1992) (citingVienna
Convention for definition of jus cogens); Footwear Distribs. & Retailers of Am. v. United States,
18 Ct. Int'l Trade 391,409 (1994) (citing Vienna Convention for its explication of principle of
pacta sunt servanda); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Singapore Airlines, No. C 91-3858, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4589, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1992) (using Vienna Convention to determine
whether nation was party to agreement); Collins v. Weinberger, 707 F.2d 1518, 1521 (D.D.C.
1983) (citing Vienna Convention for definition of treaty).
74. See Foster v. Neiison, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("Our constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts ofjustice as equiva-
lent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative
provision."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 111 cmt. d (claiming that
international agreements constitute federal law); id § 115 rep. n. 1 (equating international
agreements with statutes).
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agreement.75  In other words, the Charming Betsy principle, which
initially was enunciated in the context of customary international
law,76 also applies to international agreements."
The reconciliation of statutes and international agreements by U.S.
courts may lead to interpretations of acts that are narrower than
intended by Congress.7' Nevertheless, statutes are no more vulnera-
ble to varying interpretation because of reconciliation with interna-
tional agreements than they are in light of other canons of statutory
construction.79  Because the Charming Betsy principle mandates
reconciliation only when the statutory language permits,80 Congress
retains the ultimate power of interpretation: Congress has the
authority to enact statutes that explicitly and consciously repudiate
international norms embodied in international agreements."'
75. See Sale 509 U.S. at 177-87 (interpreting Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 in
light of Article 33 of United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees); Weinberger
v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 28-32 (1982) (limiting overseas application of employment discrimination
statute because of executive agreements between United States and Philippines); Federal Mogul
Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (referring to U.S. obligations under
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT") to evaluate propriety of International Trade
Commission's interpretation of domestic statute); Mississippi Poultry Ass'n, Inc. v. Madigan, 31
F.3d 293, 303 (5th Cir. 1994) (using NAFIA as guide in defining "same" as it appears in Poultry
Products Inspection Act); FootwearDistribs., 18 Ct. Int'l Trade at 407-14 (recognizing but rejecting
plaintiff's argument that GATT panel decision entities party to domesticjudicial relief); United
States v. Palestinian Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (limiting
interpretation of Anti-terrorism Act of 1987 because of Agreement Between the United States
and the United Nations Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations).
76. See supra Part IA.1 (describing Charming Betsy principle).
77. See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32 (using Charming Betsy to reconcile international agreement
with statute); South African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (invoking Charm-
ing Betsy to examine order pursuant to section of Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act);
Caterpillar Inc. v. United States, 941 F. Supp. 1241 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (citing Channing Betsy
to invalidate Customs Agency's construction of § 402(b) of Tariff Act of 1930); Palestinian
Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at 1464-71 (invoking Charming Betsy to reconcile international
obligation under United Nations Headquarter Agreement and Anti-terrorism Act of 1987);
Reston v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 492 F. Supp. 697, 707 (using Charming Betsy to
support FCC's interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 in light of International Telecommunication
Convention of Malaga-Torremolino); see also RE'rATMENT (TnR), supra note 4, § 114 (stating
that statutes should be interpreted so as not to conflict with international agreements whenever
possible). But see Misissippi Poultry Ass'n, 31 F.3d at 303-05 (refusing to apply Charming Betsy as
requiring Congress to express its intention to violate GATr); Suramericana de Aleaciones
Laminadas, CA v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[I]f the statutory
provisions at issue here are inconsistent with the GATT, it is a matter for Congress and not this
court to decide and remedy.").
78. For an extreme example of the use of the Charming Betsy principle to undermine
congressional intent because of absence of specific provisions in a statute renouncing treaty
obligations, see Palestinian Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at 1456.
79. See supra note 42 (discussing relationship between CharmingBetsy principle and standard
rules of statutory construction).
80. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.. . .") (emphasis added).
81. See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32 (requiring affirmative expression of intent to abrogate
international obligations); South African Airways, 817 F.2d at 126 (noting that Congress may
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B. The Helms-Burton Act
Before analyzing how customary international law and international
agreements may affect implementation of the Helms-Burton Act, it is
necessary to understand exactly what the Act does. One purpose of
the Act is to destabilize the current Cuban government by strengthen-
ing sanctions against it.8 2 It is the latest in a long series of punitive
measures aimed at Cuba since Fidel Castro took power in 1959.83
The Act restates and reinforces these previous sanctions84 and
expresses dissatisfaction over the lack of vigor with which the
Administration is enforcing the existing U.S. embargo. 5 Specifically,
Title I urges the President to enforce the U.S. embargo against
Cuba;86 to convince other nations of the need for the embargo;87 to
prohibit U.S. financing of confiscated property in Cuba;8 8 to oppose
denounce treaties freely); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (acknowledging
that Congress may nullify treaty); American Baptist Churches in the U.S. v. Meese, 712 F.
Supp. 756, 771 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (pointing out that Congress need not abide by international
law); Farr Man & Co. v. United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 55, 63-64 (1982) (noting that Congress
may supersede all or part of treaty by legislation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4,
§ 115(1) (a) (stating that Congress' ultimate authority to enact statutes supersedes existing treaty
obligations); Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 1184-85 ("If the majoritywishes by legislation to violate
international law, nothing in the Channing Betsy principle thwarts that will except to require
that it be expressed clearly.").
82. See Helms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 3(2), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 785,
788 (1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6022(2)).
83. An embargo on trade with Cuba was imposed by President Kennedy in 1962, see
Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962), using the authority of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1) (1994). Additional regulations were issued shortly
thereafter, see27 Fed. Reg. 2765 (1962), relying on the authority of the Trading with the Enemy
Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 5 (1994). After the Cuban missile crisis in October-November of 1962,
the executive branch issued more complete sanctions that have been renewed annually by the
President. SeeCuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.1. §§ 515.101 to-.809 (1996) (providing
current version of embargo regulations). Although these regulations have been subject to
multiple revisions, until the Helms-Burton Act, the most significant development occurred in
1992 when Congress passed the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010, which
codified the embargo and restricted presidential discretion in its administration. See generally
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act 90 Am. J. INT'L L. 419, 420-22
(1996) (providing comprehensive chronology of United States' anti-Castro regulatory regime).
84. SeeHelms-Burton Act §§ 101-105, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 791-95 (to be codified
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6032-6035) (calling for strict enforcement of previously enacted sanctions on
Cuba); see also H.L CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 44-47 (1996) (expressing congressional
reaffirmation of previously enacted sanctions), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 558, 559-62.
85. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 46 (1996) ("The committee of conference expresses
its profound conviction that executive branch agencies must be more vigorous in their
enforcement of certain provisions of the U.S. embargo on Cuba .... "), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.CAN. 558, 561.
86. See Helms-Burton Act § 102, 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 792-94 (to be codified at
22 U.S.C. § 6032).
87. See id. § 101(2), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 792 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6031(2)).
88. See id. § 103, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 794 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6033).
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Cuban membership in international financial institutions;8 9 to
oppose Cuban participation in the Organization of American
States;9  and to observe current import restrictions on Cuban prod-
ucts.91  In short, these provisions, among others,92 tighten the
noose that already has been tied around Cuba. 
3
If Title I resorts to the policies of the past to push Cuba toward
democracy, Title II of the Act94 looks to the future by outlining U.S.
policy toward a post-Castro Cuba. The prospective nature of Title II
serves as a message to the Cuban people, promising them better times
ahead. 5 It also establishes substantive standards for determining
what constitutes a transition governmentP6 and a democratically
elected government in Cuba. Like Title I, Title II has not proved
controversial.9
89. See id. § 104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 794-95 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6034).
90. See id. § 105, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 795 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6035).
91. See id. § 110, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 800 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6040).
92. See, e.g., id § 106, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 795-98 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6036) (assessing role offormer Soviet states in Cuba); id. § 107, 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.)
at 798 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6037) (converting Television Marti Service to UHF); idi
§ 108, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 798-99 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6038) (calling for
report on extent of aid supplied and business conducted with Cuba by foreign countries); id
§ 109, 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 799-800 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6039) (authorizing
appropriations for certain democracy-building activities in Cuba); id § 111, 1996 U.S.C.CAN.
(110 Stat.) at 800-02 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6041) (withholding funds from countries
supporting construction ofJuragua NucearPlantin Cuba); cf id. § 114,1996 U.SC.C.A.N. (110
Stat.) at 803 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6044) (authorizing President to establish exchange
of news bureaus with Cuba under specific circumstances).
93. This analogy was used by both sides of the debate over the Helms-Burton Act. See 142
CONG. REC. H1731 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1996) (statement of Rep. Diaz-Balart) (supporting
tightening of"economic noose" around Castro); id. at S1479 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Kassenbaum) (questioning usefulness of tightening "the noose around Cuba"); 141
CONG. REC. E1851 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995) (statement by Hon. Lynn C. Woolsey of Cal.)
(arguing that tightening "an economic noose around the island of Cuba" will bring only misery
to innocent Cuban citizens).
94. Helms-Burton Act §§ 201-207, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 805-14 (to be codified
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6061-6067).
95. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 52 (1996) ("Title II sends a clear message to the
Cuban People that the United States is prepared fully to assist in a peaceful, democratic
transition. .. ."), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 558, 567.
96. See Helms-Burton Act § 205, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 811-12 (to be codified at
22 U.S.C. § 6065) (providing criteria for transition government in Cuba).
97. See it& § 206, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 812-13 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6066) (establishing criteria for what constitutes a democratically elected government in Cuba).
98. Even one of the most vocal critics of the Helms-Burton Act, Representative Lee
Hamilton of Indiana, would have accepted the provisions in Titles I and II. During hearings,
Rep. Hamilton offered an amendment to the bill that would have preserved the first two titles
of the proposed legislation while eliminating the more objectionable elements of Titles III and
IV. See Markup by the House Comm. on Int'l Relations on H.R. 927, 104th Cong. 19, 40 (1995)
[hereinafter House Markup].
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The significant and controversial provisions in the Act are found in
Titles III and IV.99  Title III"°  makes any person who "traffics"' 10
in property'0 2 confiscated by the Cuban government on or after
January 1, 1959, civilly liable for monetary damages to any U.S.
national who owns the claim to that property.' The legal theory
behind this provision is the tort theory of conversion: °4 the cause
of action redresses injury to U.S. nationals10 5 whose property was
confiscated 16 by making investors who use that property liable.
99. See id. at 43-45 (presenting responses of House members to Rep. Hamilton's
amendment to strike Tides III and IV from Act). Congressman Burton argued that Titles III
and LV would not open the floodgates of litigation for claims to property by non-U.S. nationals
in U.S. courts. See id. at 43. He further argued that determining the chain of title to
confiscated property would not be difficult. See id. at 44. Finally, he argued that Title V could
and would be implemented consistently with NAFFA. See id. Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen
noted that international concern about the bill already has deterred foreign investment in Cuba.
See id. at 44-45.
100. SeeHelms-Burton Act §§ 301-306,1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at814-22 (to be codified
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081-6085).
101. See supra note 12 (providing definition of "traffics" in Act).
102. "Property" for purposes of the Act is defined broadly to mean "any property (including
patents, copyrights, trademarks, and any other form of intellectual property), whether real,
personal, or mixed, and any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest
therein, including any leasehold interest." Helms-Burton Act § 4(12) (A), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N.
(110 Stat.) at 790 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6023(12) (A)). The Act further states, as related
to Title III:
"[P]roperty" does not include real property used for residential purposes unless, as of
the date of the enactment of this Act-
(i) the claim to the property is held by a United States national and the claim has
been certified under title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949; or
(ii) the property is occupied by an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling
political party in Cuba.
Id& § 4(12) (B), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (I10 Stat.) at 790 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6023(12) (B)).
103. See idL § 302(a) (1), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 815 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a) (1)).
104. See House Markup, supra note 98, at 21 ("The basic theory of this legislation... is a tort
theory, not a contract theory. The effort is to redress injury, not settle disputed issues about
who owns the property."); see also Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act Is Consistent
rith Idtenational Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 437 n.17 (1996) (citing FA MANN, FURTHER
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (1990), for discussion of conversion in relation to illegal
confiscations of property).
105. "United States national" is defined as:
(A) any United States citizen; or(B) any other legal entity which is organized under the laws of the United States, or
of any State, the District of Columbia, or any commonwealth, territory, or possession
of the United States, and which has its principal place of business in the United States.
Helms-Burton Act § 4(15), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 791 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6023(15)).
106. "Confiscated" is defined for purposes of the Act as:
(A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the Cuban Government
of ownership or control of property, on or after January 1, 1959-
(i) without the property having been returned or adequate and effective
compensation provided; or
(ii) without the claim to the property having been settled pursuant to an interna-
tional claims settlement agreement or other mutually accepted settlement proce-
dure; and
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Such liability begins three months after the effective date of the
Act.
10 7
The provisions in Title III create two kinds of plaintiffs, both of
which must meet certain baseline requirements. To bring an action
under this section, all claimants: (1) must have acquired ownership
of their claim to the property before March 12, 1996, if the property
was confiscated before that date;' (2) must not have acquired post-
confiscation ownership by assignment if the property was confiscated
on or after March 12, 1996;'" (3) may not bring claims against
"persons" two years after those persons have ceased their "trafficking"
activity;' 0 (4) must meet a minimum claim value of more than
(B) the repudiation by the Cuban Government of, the default by the Cuban
Government on, or the filure of the Cuban Government to pay, on or afterJanuary
1, 1959
(i) a debt of any enterprise which has been nationalized, expropriated, or
otherwise taken by the Cuban Government;
(ii) a debt which is a charge on property nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise
taken by the Cuban Government; or
(iii) a debt which was incurred by the Cuban Government in satisfaction or
settlement of a confiscated property claim.
Id. § 4(4), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 789 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6023(4)); see also
supra note 102 (providing statute's definition of "property").
107. See Helms-Burton Act § 302(a)(1)(A), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 815 (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a) (1) (A)). Because the Act holds liable any "person" who benefits
in any way from confiscated property in Cuba, Congress realized that once the Act was signed,
any "person" attempting to comply with it by selling off this property would be in violation of
the Act. Congress therefore allowed these individuals a three-month grace period. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 57-58 (1996) (reasoning that grace period will allow persons to wind
down activities so that they may avoid liability), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 558, 572-73.
108. See Helms-Burton Act § 302(a)(4)(B), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 816 (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B)). This provision is one of many that attempt to prevent
a market for claims to confiscated property. This paragraph seeks to eliminate the incentive that
may exist for foreign nationals, who are not entitled to the cause of action created in Title Il1,
to transfer claims to confiscated property to U.S. nationals. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-468,
at 59 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 558, 574. The provision also attempts to discourage
foreign entities with claims to confiscated property from relocating to the United States in order
to take advantage of the Act. See id.; see also House Markup, supra note 98, at 18-19 (discussing
effects of Act on clouding title to certified claims); i&. at 46-48 (discussing hypothetical of
corporation becoming U.S. national after date of enactment of legislation).
Despite the clear intent expressed in the Conference Report and the explanation of the
provision presented by Counsel to the House International Relations Committee, Mr.
Rademaker, the language is unclear. A plain reading of the provision does not necessarily
preclude a company that has owned a claim to confiscated property since 1959, and becomes
a U.S. national in 1997, from filing suit against a "trafficker." Similarly, a Cuban national that
has owned a claim since 1959 and flees Cuba today will have a cause of action under the Act.
109. See Helms-Burton Act § 302(a) (4) (C), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 816 (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a) (4) (C)).
110. See id. § 305, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 821 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6084).
1997] THE HELMS-BURTON ACT 1309
$50,000;"' and (5) may base their claims on liability accruing from
November 1, 1996.112
The first class of plaintiffs are those with claims certified by the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission ("the Commission") .11 To
succeed in their cause of action, these plaintiffs only need present the
certified claim" 4 and demonstrate that the defendant "traffics"" 5
in the claimed property. Once these showings are made, plaintiffs
may collect court costs and reasonable attorney fees," 6 plus three
times the amount certified by the Commission or treble the fair
market value of the property,"7 whichever is greater."' The plain-
tiffs in this class who recover these funds may receive additional
payments from a subsequent claims settlement agreement reached
between the United States and Cuba only if the amount already
received is less than the amount of their certified claim." 9
The second class of plaintiffs consists of those who do not have
certified claims with the Commission. These claimants: (1) cannot
file claims under this provision if they were eligible to file a claim with
the Commission but failed to do so; 20 (2) cannot re-establish claims
111. See id. § 302(b), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 817 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(b)). The minimum claim value is computed as stipulated in subclause (i) of
§ 302(a) (1) (A), minus any interest.
112. Section 302(a) of the Act establishes liability three months after the effective date of
Title III, which, according to § 306(a), is August 1, 1996. See id. §§ 302(a), 306(b), 1996
U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 815-17, 821 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6082(a), 6085(b)).
113. See International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994) (establishing
that purpose ofsubchapter is to determine amount and validity of claims to confiscated property
by U.S. nationals against Cuban and Chinese governments).
114. The court must accept the Commission's certification as conclusive proof of ownership.
See Helms-Burton Act § 303(a)(1), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 819-20 (to be codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6083(a)(1)).
115. See supra note 12 (defining "trafficking" for purposes of Act).
116. See Helms-Burton Act § 302(a)(1)(A)(ii), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 815 (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a) (1) (A) (ii)).
117. See id. § 302(a)(3)(A), (C), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 815, 816 (to be codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a) (3) (A), (C)).
118. See id. § 302(a) (1) (A) (i), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 815 (to be codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6082(a) (1)(A)(i)). There is a presumption in favor of the amount that is certified by
the Commission even if the other amounts are greater. This presumption may be rebutted by
showing through clear and convincing evidence that the fair market value is "appropriate." See
id § 302(a) (2), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 815 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (a) (2)).
Congress provided no explanation in the Act or the legislative history of what constitutes
"appropriate."
119. See id. § 302(f) (2) (A), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 818-19 (to be codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6082(f) (2) (A)). If a plaintiff receives an amount equal to or greater than the certified
claim, that plaintiff will not receive any payments from a subsequent claims settlement between
the United States and Cuba.
120. See id. § 302(a) (5) (A), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 816 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a) (5) (A)). The Act establishes a priority for those claims certified with the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission. See id. § 302(a) (5) (C), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 817 (to
be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a) (5) (C)) (disallowing for two years claims not certified under
Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act).
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denied by the Commission, as the Commission's findings will be
accepted as conclusive by the courts that hear cases under this
provision;' 2' (3) must wait until March 12, 1998, to file an action
under this title;122 (4) have the burden of proving that their interest
in property is not the subject of a certified claim by another per-
son;123 (5) may certify their claims by a court-appointed special
master for fact-finding purposes only;124 (6) must show by clear and
convincing evidence that it is appropriate that they receive the fair
market value for their property;1" and (7) may collect triple the
value of their property only when the action is brought thirty days
after giving notice to "traffickers," if such notice is given after the
Act's three-month grace period has expired.1 26
Title III includes other important provisions. 27 For example, all
Title III claimants are forbidden from filing other civil actions under
the same subject matter. 21 Similarly, claimants may not file an
action under Title III if they seek compensation for a claim in
another civil action that would be cognizable under this title. 29 All
claimants, however, are allowed to bring and settle their cases without
presenting any sort of license from a government agency.130 The
Act makes immune property in Cuba that is used as a facility or
121. See id. § 302(a) (5) (B), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 816 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a) (5) (B)).
122. See id § 302(a) (5)(C), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 817 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a) (5) (C)).
123. See id. § 302(a)(5)(D), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 817 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a) (5) (D)).
124. See id. § 303(a) (2), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 820 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6083(a) (2)).
125. See id § 302(a) (2), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 815 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a) (2)).
126. See id. § 302(a)(3)(B), (D), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 816 (to be codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6082(a) (3) (B), (D)). Notice must be in writing and sent by certified mail or delivered
personally. See id. § 302(a) (3) (D), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 816 (to be codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6082(a)(3)(D)). The effective date of Title III is August 1, 1996; thus, notice may be
given after September 1, 1996.
127. For a summary of additional provisions of Title III, see Summary of the Provisions of
Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg.
24,955 (1996).
128. See Helms-Burton Act § 302(f)(1)(A), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 818 (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(f) (1) (A)).
129. See id. § 302(f) (1) (B), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 818 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(0 (1) (B)).
130. See id. § 302(a) (7), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 817 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a) (7)). The co-founder of the United States-Cuba Foundation criticized this provision
as a way of allowing claimants to share in the profits of those doing business with Cuba. See
Louis F. Desloge, The Great Cuban Embargo Scam: A Little-Known Loophole Will Allow the Richeit
Exiles to Cash 1n, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1996, at C1. This point also was made by Rep.Jack Reed
of Rhode Island. See 142 CONG. REC. E309 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Reed).
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installation for official purposes by an accredited diplomatic mis-
sion. 3' More significantly, the Act declares inapplicable the act-of-
state doctrine,3 2 which otherwise would have been a strong defense
to the cause of action Title III creates.133 Finally, the Act grants the
President various powers of suspension'3 and provides means for
terminating the rights it grants. 5
131. See Helms-Burton Act § 302(e), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Star.) at 818 (to be codified at
22 U.S.C. § 6082(e)).
132. See id. § 302(a)(6), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Star.) at 817 (to be codified at 22 U.S.c.
§ 6082(a)(6)). This court-made doctrine was defined first in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250, 252 (1897), and although it currently is subject to some uncertainty, the act-of-state
doctrine has been explained as follows:
In the absence of a treaty or other unabiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles, courts in the United States will generally refrain from examining the validity
of a taking by a foreign state of property within its own territory, or from sitting in
judgment on other acts of a government character done by a foreign state within its
own territory and applicable there.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 443(1). The Restatement (Third) recognizes that the
doctrine is subject to modifications by legislation. See id. at § 443(2).
133. One commentator believes that this provision is the most significant part of the Act,
because absent the act-of-state doctrine, lawsuits against those benefiting from confiscated
property would be cognizable. See Brice M. Clagett, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act, Continued. A Reply to ProfessorLowenfeld, 90 AM.J. INT'L L. 641,644 (1996). An
often cited case applying the act-of-state doctrine, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964), involved confiscation of property in Cuba.
134. See Helms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 306(b)-(d), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.)
785, 821-22 (1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6085(b)-(d)). President Clinton refused to use
his powers under § 306(b) to postpone the effective date of Title III for up to six months. He
did, however, use his power under subsection (c) to suspend for six months the right to bring
an action under Title III. See Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff, Office of the Press Secretary, The White
House, Press Briefing (July 16, 1996) <http://library.whitehouse.gov/
Retrieve.cgi?dbtype=type-=-text&id=6921&query=/> (on file with The American University Law
Review) [hereinafter Berger-TarnoffBriefing]; see also Rossella Brevetti & Peter Menyasz, Clinton
Delays Lawsuits Under Title III of Helms-Burton, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1158, 1158 (July 17,
1996) (reporting President Clintqn's decision not to suspend effective date but to suspend right
to bring lawsuits under Title III). This suspension must be renewed every six months. See
Helms-Burton Act § 306(c) (2), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 822 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6085(c)(2)). President Clinton has indicated that he will exercise his authority under
§ 306(c) (2) to grant six-month suspensions for the indefinite future. See Myers, supra note 25,
at A6 (reporting indefinite suspension). To suspend the right of action, the executive had to
determine and report to Congress that the suspension is necessary "to the national interests of
the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba." Helms-Burton Act
§ 306(c)(2), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 822 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6085(c)(2)).
This determination was made despite the judgment of the conference committee of Congress
that "under current circumstances the President could not in good faith determine that
suspension of the right of action is either 'necessary to the national interests of the United
States' or 'will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.'" H.R. CONF REP. No. 104-468, at
65 (1996) (quoting Helms-Burton Act § 306(c) (1) (B), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 822 (to
be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6085(c) (1) (B))), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 558, 580.
135. See Helms-Burton Act § 302(h), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 819 (to be codified at
22 U.S.C. § 6082(h)) (providing that rights established under § 302 can be suspended if
President determines that democratically elected government is in power in Cuba).
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Title IV of the Act relates to the exclusion of certain aliens from
the United States.!"6 The title requires that the Secretary of State
deny visas to all aliens who confiscate property, "traffic" in such
confiscated property, or act as officers or controlling shareholders of
an entity that confiscates or traffics in such property. 7 This prohi-
bition extends to the spouses, minor children, and agents of these
aliens." s  This title, however, employs different definitions of
"confiscated" and "trafficking" than those used in the other sections
of the Act."9 Also, unlike Title III, Title IV may not be suspend-
ed. 40
II. ANALYSIS: POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION
A. Violations of International Customary Law
1. Title III as a secondary boycott
According to some commentators, Title III of the Act effectuates a
secondary boycott against nations trading with Cuba. 4 ' To under-
136. For a detailed summary of the provisions in Title IV, see Guidelines Implementing Title
V of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg.
30,655 (1996).
137. See Helms-Burton Act § 401, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 822-24 (to be codified at
22 U.S.C. § 6091).
138. See id § 401(a)(4), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 822 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.§ 6091(a)(4)). For a story of the effect of Title IV on the family members of a Mexican
businessman, see Molly Moore, Tighter Cuban Embargo Snares Mexican, Despite U.S. Ties, WASH.
POST, Sept. 9, 1996, at A14.
139. Compare Helms-Burton Act § 4(13), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 790-91 (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)) (defining "traffics" for purposes of Title III), with id.§ 401(b)(2), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at823-24 (to be codified at22 U.S.C. § 6091(b)(2))(defining "traffics" for purposes of Title IV). The conference report states that "the definition
of trafficking for purposes of section 401 is slightly narrower than the definition applicable to
title III set forth in section 4(13)." H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-468, at 66 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.CAN. 558,581. The difference reflects congressional intent to apply Title IV only to new
acts of trafficking that begin on or after March 12, 1996, the date of enactment, and to avoid
application of Title IV to acts of divestiture from Cuba. See id., reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN.
558, 581.
140. Compare Helms-Burton Act § 306(b)-(d), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 821-22 (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6085(b)-(d)) (granting suspension authority to President), with id.§ 401(d), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 824 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6091(d))(specifying effective date of Title IV provisions as date of enactment of Act, that is, March 12,
1996).
141. See Lowenfeld, supra note 83, at 429 ("[T]he Helms-Burton Act is... in intent-and
probably in effect-a classical secondary boycott... ."); Helms-Burton Law Guidelines Are
Inadequate, Lawyer Charges, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1050, 1050 (June 26, 1996) (reporting
remarks of Michael Leir, minister for Canadian Embassy, referring to Act as de facto secondary
boycott);Joseph Kirwin, EURejects Transport Networks as Tool to Fight Unemployment, 13 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1064, 1064 (June 26,1996) (quoting statement of European Council characterizing
Act as secondary boycott). Although defendants in Title III actions may include foreign
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stand this type of boycott, it is instructive to examine the primary
boycott. A primary boycotte is limited to transactions between the
boycotting nation A and the boycotted nation B. Using the terms of
sanction laws, the sender A prevents its nationals from trading with
the target B and its nationals."' Because A bases jurisdiction on its
control over its own territory and its own nationals, a primary boycott
rarely raises questions of international law."M A secondary boycott
however, is a different matter."4 It reaches beyond nations A and
B to restrict transactions between person X a national of state C, and
nation B. A's leverage with X usually stems from the fact that X has
some kind of business interest in A. Because X does business with A
and A does not allow business with B, under the structure of a
secondary boycott, Xmust make a choice between doing business with
A or doing business with B. X is forced to choose even though X's
activities are perfectly legal from the point of view of its own country
C.14 6
A broad reading of the Helms-Burton Act creates this choice for
foreign companies that have interests in both Cuba and the United
States. As stated by Congress and others, one purpose of the Act is
to discourage business with Castro's Cuba. 47 In addition to state-
companies trading with Cuba, the Act is primarily anti-Cuba legislation. For example, twenty-six
of the twenty-eight findings in the Act directly address the crimes of Cuba, and the other two
findings concern U.S. policy toward Cuba and United Nations treatment of rogue nations. See
Helms-Burton Act § 2, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 786-88 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6021). The majority of the findings in Title III emphasize the wrongful nature of Cuba's
action in confiscating the property. See id. § 301, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Star.) at 814-15 (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081); see also Lowenfeld, supra note 83, at 430; Malcolm Rifiind,
Punishing the Wrong Party, WASH. POST, May 27, 1996, at A23 (criticizing United States for
targeting companies that do business with terrorist states).
142. For an explication of the eponymous origin of the word "boycott," its historical
meaning, and its judicial applications in antitrust and labor law, see Justice Scalia's opinion in
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 800-11 (1993) (Scalia, J.).
143. See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED:
HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 27-28 (1985) (defining "sender," "target," and types of sanctions).
144. See Lowenfeld, supra note 83, at 429 ("[A] primary boycott does not usually raise issues
of international law, because the boycotting state is exercising its jurisdiction in its own territory
or over its own nationals.").
145. This discussion of secondary boycotts is in the context of international trade. Although
conceptually similar, secondary boycotts in the context of labor law is beyond the scope of this
Comment. See Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union
Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 397-404 (1984) (discussing history of political and judicial
treatment of secondary boycotts used by unions).
146. See Lowenfeld, supra note 83, at 429-30 (noting that secondary boycott occurs when one
state tells nationals of another state that they may not trade with a third state even though trade
with that third state is permitted by laws of state in which nationals reside).
147. See H.1R REP. NO. 104-202, at 39 (1996) (explaining that purpose of Act is to deny
Castro's regime the capital it obtains from confiscations), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527,544;
see also Berger-Tarnoff Briefing, supra note 134 (statement of Sandy Berger) ("The fundamental
purpose of Title III ... is to promote the transition of democracy in Cuba."); Cuba and the
United States: Scarecrow, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 1996, at 38 (quoting Nicolas Gutierrez, a
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ments by the drafters of the legislation, various provisions in the Act
manifest this purpose.'" The United States (nation A) seeks to
discourage foreign companies (X) based in other nations (C) from
trading with Cuba (nation B). Although the Act does not forbid
trade with Cuba,'49 it exposes such traders to large damages °
through litigation. Thus, those who trade with Cuba face a Hobson's
choice. 5' Because the choice given to these nations is, in fact, no
choice at all, the Act seeks to prevent conduct that takes place lawfully
outside the United States. 152 Title III thus resembles a secondary
boycott against nations trading with Cuba.'
Although U.S. participation in secondary boycotts has been
outlawed domestically," secondary boycotts are not per se viola-
tions of international law. 55  Nevertheless, the extraterritorial
framework upon which secondary boycotts rely may breach interna-
tional legal principles. 56  These principles restrict the prescriptive
jurisdiction of domestic statutes, or the extent to which national
lawyerwho represents Nat'l Ass'n of Sugar Mill Owners of Cuba and was involved in crafting the
Act, as saying "[t] he main objective is to drive foreigners out of Cuba).
148. These provisions include a three-month grace period before liability is triggered, see
Helms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 302(a) (1), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) 785, 815
(1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a) (1)), and treble damages, id. § 302(a) (3), 1996
U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 815-16 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a) (3)).
149. See Clagett, supra note 133, at 641 ("[T]itle III deals only with 'trade' of a specific type:
occupying, dealing in or otherwise benefiting or profiting from property that was confiscated
from U.S. nationals without compensation .... ").
150. See supra text accompanying notes 116-19, 126 (describing sums of money involved in
litigation).
151. See Lowenfeld, supra note 83, at 429 (describing X's choice as one "between an ice
cream sundae and a root canal treatment").
152. See id. at 430 (describing U.S. actions as coercive and unreasonable because trade it
proscribes occurs outside U.S. borders, is otherwise legal, and is legal in other state); see also H.
Scott Fairley, Does Helms-Burton Act Violate International Law. An Argument in the
Affirmative, Remarks at the American Conference Institute Program 20 (June 24, 1996) (on file
with The American University Law Review).
153. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text (discussing Helms-Burton Act as a
secondary boycott).
154. See Export Administration Act of 1977, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(5) (A)-(B) (1994).
155. The Restatement (Third), the primary source of norms of international law for this
Comment, see supra note 26, mentions secondary boycotts only once, see RE TATENIENT (THIRD),
supra note 4, § 441 rep. n. 4, in relation to persons subject to U.S.jurisdiction, see Clagett, supra
note 104, at 436 n.13 (suggesting that secondary boycott does not violate international law).
156. Not all exercises of extraterritorialjurisdiction are per se violations ofinternational law.
Seendreas F. Lowenfeld, InternationalLitigation and the QuestforReasonableness, in 1994-I RECUEIL
DES CouRs 9,43-44 (L'Academie de Droit International 1995) (stating that great deal ofconduct
involved in litigation takes place in more than one state and criticizing pejorative use of
extraterritorial). Following Professor Lowenfeld's advice, this analysis attempts to restrict its
discussion to "jurisdictional" questions rather than to "extraterritorial" questions to avoid
pejorative connotations of the latter designation. See id. at 44 (suggesting that it is best to think
of issue in terms of "jurisdiction to prescribe" rather than to taint discussion by characterizingjurisdiction as "extraterritorial"). Nevertheless, the use of "extraterritorial" is, at times, hard to
avoid, but it should be noted that the limited use of this term implies no a priori negative
judgment of the action being discussed.
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legislation may extend to conduct outside a nation's borders.157
The following sections examine these principles in greater depth.
2. Title HII and jurisdictional issues
If the target of the Helms-Burton Act is conduct of non-U.S.
nationals that occurs outside U.S. territory, Congress cannot rely on
the two principal justifications for its jurisdiction to prescribe, namely
territoriality and nationality.5 Section 402 of the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law, however, offers bases for exercising authority
over conduct that do not rely on these justifications. These bases of
authority allow prescription of behavior that has a substantial effect
inside the United States or that endangers its security.59
United States courts have extended extraterritorial application of
domestic statutes to conduct that has a "substantial effect" inside the
United States."t This principle has become a part of international
157. Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to a state's authority "to make its law applicable to the
activities, relations, or ... persons." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 401(a). Interna-
tional law recognizes limitations to a state's authority to prescribe laws, see id., and sets forth
various bases upon which this authority must be based. See id. § 402. Part II_3 of this
Comment analyzes whether the required conditions are met in the context of the Helms-Burton
Act. See infra text accompanying notes 158-208. The other forms of jurisdiction under
international law are jurisdiction to adjudicate, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 421,
and jurisdiction to enforce, see id. § 431. See generally OLIVER Er AL, supra note 35, at 132-270
(discussing forms ofjurisdiction in international law). For discussions of the application of the
principle of prescriptive jurisdiction in U.S. courts, see Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764,813-14 (1995) (ScaliaJ., dissenting in part); SocieteNationaleIndustrielleAerospatiale
v. United States District Cour4 482 U.S. 522, 544 (1987); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964); Neely v. Club Med Management Services, 63 F.3d 166, 176 (1995); and Phillipines
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75-76 (1994).
It was on lack of U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe that the State Department initially opposed
enactment of the Helms-Burton Act. See House Markup, supra note 98, at 19-20, 55 (testimony
of Allen Weiner, Attorney-Advisor, State Dep't, Office of Legal Advisor).
158. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, at 237 introductory note ("Territoriality and
nationality remain the principal bases ofjurisdiction to prescribe."). Territoriality, that is, the
nation's authority to regulate conduct that takes place within its territory, is the unquestioned
form of jurisdiction. See id. § 402 cmts. b-c. ("The territorial principle is by far the most
common basis for the exercise ofjurisdiction to prescribe, and it has generally been free from
controversy."). Because the Helms-Burton Act, if applied broadly, will regulate conduct that
occurs outside its territory, the territorial principle does not apply. The nationality principle
historically referred to a nation's authority to control the conduct of its citizens, no matter
where that conduct took place. See id. § 402(2). It is an "exceptional ... basis for the exercise
of jurisdiction." Id. § 402 CMt. b. Because the Helms-Burton Act, if applied broadly, will
regulate the conduct of non-U.S. nationals, the nationality principle does not apply.
159. SeeREsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 402(1) (c), (2) (describing "substantial effect"
and "security of state" principles).
160. SeeHartfordFire, 509 U.S. at 796 (citing as "well-established," application of Sherman Act
to foreign conduct because of substantial effects doctrine); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 (emphasizing that "American antitrust laws do not regulate the
competitive conditions of other nations' economies"); American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781, 786 (1946); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 442 (1945)
(stating "that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state
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law. 6' In examining the Helms-Burton Act, therefore, the question
becomes whether the act of "trafficking" as defined by the Act has a
"substantial effect" inside the United States. As the following
argument contends, broad jurisdictional authority of the Act may not
be based on the substantial effects doctrine.162
The Act explicitly claims to provide rules of law relating to conduct
that, although occurring outside the United States, has a substantial
effect within its territory1' This conclusory statement, however,
must be reconciled with the underlying "effect" addressed in the Act,
that is, the wrongful confiscation of property by Castro's Cuba."
The Act contains no specific findings that "trafficking" promotes the
confiscation of property of U.S. nationals; rather, the findings merely
show that Cuba benefits economically from this "trafficking."'"a The
reprehends"). See generally OLIVER ET AL, supra note 35, at 137-165 (discussing effects principle,
also known as objective territoriality, in context of international law norms); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 4, § 402(1)(c). Although the "substantial effect" principle is controversial,
the European Community increasingly has invoked it to regulate restrictive business practices.
See id. § 402 rep. n. 2.
161. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 402.
162. The caveat provided in supra note 26 is worth repeating- the conclusory nature of some
of these arguments is intended to introduce the statutory construction questions, infra Part II.C.
Nevertheless, a conclusory argument is not necessarily without merit. The merits of the
argument against jurisdiction based on the substantial effects doctrine are bolstered by the
Opinion of the Inter-AmnericanJuridical Committee on Resolution AG/DOC.3375/96, Freedom
of Trade and Investment in the Hemisphere, CJI/RES.II-14/96, §§ 8-9 (Aug. 23, 1996) (holding
that "[ a] prescribing State does not have the right to exercisejurisdiction over acts of trafficking
abroad by aliens under circumstances where neither the alien nor the conduct in question has
any connection with its territory").
163. SeeHelms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 301 (9), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) 785,
815 (1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081(9)). The language used by Congress is almost
identical to the language of the Restatement (Third). Compare id. ("International law recognizes
that a nation has the ability to provide for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its
territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory."), with RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 402(1) (c) ("[A] state hasjurisdiction to prescribe lawwith respect
to ... conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect with its
territory . .. ."). The language in the Act, however, does not supply the qualifier of
reasonableness that is present in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 403. See Lowenfeld,
supra note 83, at 431 (pointing out that Congress' attempt to "impose US policy on third
countries or their nationals is unreasonable by any standard" and that Americans would be
"outraged" if other countries imposed their policies on United States); see also infra Part IIA.3.a
(discussing reasonableness principle).
164. The effects defined by Title III include: (1) the confiscation of property by Castro's
Cuba, see Helms-Burton Act § 301(3), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 814 (to be codified at 22
U.S.C. §6081(3)); (2) the offering of such property to foreign investors, see id. § 301(5), 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 814 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081(5)); (3) the undermining of
U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, see id. § 301(6), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 814 (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081(6)); (4) the protection of the property rights of U.S. citizens, see
id. § 301(10), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 815 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081(10)); and
(5) the victimization of U.S. nationals, who should be given a remedy, see id. § 301(11), 1996
U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 815 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081(11)).
165. See id. § 301(6), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 814 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6081(6)) (relating that through "trafficking" activities Cuba obtains "financial benefit,
including hard currency, oil, and productive investment and expertise").
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findings in the Act, therefore, offer no viable nexus between
"trafficking" and confiscation.,' This failure to make a causal
connection between the conduct prescribed and the purpose behind
that prescription is related to the secondary boycott structure of the
Act.167 The Act attempts to punish Cuba by creating a cause of
action against third parties dealing with Cuba. The injury for which
Congress attempts to compensate, however, is not an injury caused by
the "trafficking" countries. In short, Congress is forcing third parties
to pay for Cuba's wrongs."6
Under the protective principle, international law permits a state to
control conduct that endangers its security.169 One potential effect
in the United States of the confiscation of property from Cuban
nationals is an increase in the flow of refugees to the United States
from Cuba.17' Even assuming that an influx of refugees constitutes
a threat to U.S. security, the Act fails to make findings suggesting that
"trafficking" in property leads to more Cubans seeking refuge. 7 1
The Helms-Burton Act makes findings related only to Cuba's threat to
the United States,17 not to threats posed by the conduct targeted
166. On the other hand, it may be argued that the tort theory of a Tite III cause of action
creates a sufficient nexus. See supra note 104 (discussing theory of conversion that underlies
Title III). In other words, foreign companies that benefit from confiscated property in Cuba
are depriving rightful owners of that benefit. When the deprivation is inflicted upon a U.S.
national, there is a substantial effect in the United States. For the strongest arguments
supportingjurisdiction based on the substantial effect principle, see Clagett, supra note 104, and
Clagett, supra note 133.
167. See supra Part IIA.1 (discussing secondary boycotts).
168. See Lowenfeld, supra note 83, at 431 (pointing to Cuba as source of behavior that
Congress seeks to address).
169. See RSrATEMENT (THmD), supra note 4, § 402(3) (permitting state to prescribe law
when act is "directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state
interests"); id § 402 cmt. f (allowing states to punish offenses that threaten both their security
and the integrity of their governmental functions).
170. See Helms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 2(19), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) 785,
787 (1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021(19)) (citing legislative findings).
171. In fact, an argument can be made that the Act will have a powerful impact on Cuba,
leading to the demise of Fidel Castro. Upon his departure and the installation of a transition
government leading to a democracy, the flight of refugees will cease. An equally plausible
argument is that, given Castro's ability to endure several embargoes in the past, this Act will not
trigger his fall. Many have warned that Castro will use the Act to rally the Cuban people. See
H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 57 (1996) (arguing from Helms-Burton dissenters' point ofview that
Castro will use Act to bolster nationalistic arguments), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527, 556.
The point here is that the connection between Cuban refugees in Florida and a Canadian
company's use of Cuban land is remote at best and would not satisfy the effects principle.
172. Se e g., Helms-Burton Act § 2(13), 1996 U.S.C.CA..N. (110 Stat.) at 787 (to be codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 6021(13)) (denouncing Cuban government's role in harboring fugitives and
trading drugs); id. § 2(14), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 787 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6021(14)) (finding that Cuba engages in terrorism); id § 2(19), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.)
at 787 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021(19)) (finding that Castro uses illegal means to
influence actions of Western Hemipshere sovereigns); i& § 2(28), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.)
at 788 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §6021(28)) (finding that Cuban government continues to
pose national security threat to United States).
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by the Act. Additionally, although Title III punishes foreign compa-
nies dealing with Cuba, the Act does not brand their conduct a
national security threat. Rather, the Helms-Burton Act recognizes
only that the use by foreign companies of confiscated property
undermines U.S. foreign policy"' For purposes of the protective
principle, frustrated foreign policy goals do not constitute national
security risks.74
3. Limitations on jurisdiction
a. Reasonableness
Even if a party successfully argues that the "effects principle" or the
"protective principle" reaches the conduct that Title III regulates, 75
the party must show that jurisdiction exercised pursuant to either
principle is reasonable. 76 Construed broadly, the Helms-Burton Act
may not meet any of the following factors relevant to determining
reasonableness:
(1) Territorial link:177 The Act relates to conduct that may take
place completely outside U.S. territory. Based on the Act's definition
of "trafficking," a company only need benefit from some transaction
involving confiscated property in Cuba to fall within the ambit of the
Act. 78 That benefit need not accrue to nor affect the U.S. entity
being sued. 79 Indeed, any conduct that occurs in the United States
173. See id. § 301(6), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 814 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6081(6)).
174. The sort of national security threats envisioned by the protective principle are more
specific and direct than general foreign policy goals. According to the Restatement (Third), the
protective principle refers to
a limited class of offenses committed outside [a state's] territory by persons who are
not its nationals-offenses directed against the security of the state or other offenses
threatening the integrity of governmental functions that are generally recognized as
crimes by developed legal systems, e.g., espionage, counterfeiting of the state's seal or
currency, falsification of official documents, as well as perjury before consular officials,
and conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs laws.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 402 cmt. f.
175. See Clagett, supra note 104, at 435-36 (arguing that Cuba's proximity to United States,
its continued suppression of democracy, and its reluctance to relinquish property owned by U.S.
nationals substantially affect United States).
176. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 403(1) ("Even when one of the bases for
jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable.").
177. Seeid. § 403(2)(a).
178. See supra note 12 (discussing definition of "trafficking" for purposes of Act).
179. The definition of "trafficking" appears to be broad enough to allow suit against a U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign parent company when the parent draws some benefit from confiscated
property in Cuba. See Helms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 4(13), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110
Stat.) 785, 790-91 (1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)) (defining "traffics" for
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already is covered by other U.S. laws.' Because the conduct most
likely will occur outside the United States, a territorial link as the basis
for jurisdiction does not weigh in favor of the United States.
(2) Other connections:'8' Most defendants in cases brought under
the Helms-Burton Act will not be U.S. nationals.8 In fact, there
may be no connection between "the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated"8 3 and the United States. The plaintiffs
in such cases must be U.S. nationals,8 4 so there will be some
connection between the regulating state and "those whom the
regulation is designed to protect.""s Nevertheless, the connection
may be nominal 86
(3) Character of the regulation and its importance to the regulating
state.'8 7  Many countries legally engage in activity regulated by the
Act, namely benefitting from confiscated properties. In fact, the
United States allows (indeed, promotes) this same activity when the
confiscated property is in a country other than Cuba188
(4) Frustration ofjustified expectations'8 9 Just as a Canadian compa-
ny operating in the United States expects to be required to comply
with U.S. law relating to its U.S. operations, xg° that company expects
its operations in Cuba to be regulated only by Cuban and Canadian
laws.' 9' There is no expectation of U.S. jurisdiction over a foreign
company's operations that do not involve the United States. Under
the Helms-Burton Act, however, foreign companies may face liability
purposes of Title III of Act).
180. See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1994).
181. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 403(2) (b) (listing "nationality, residence, or
economic activity" as reasonableness factors).
182. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 forbids any dealings with Cuba by U.S. nationals.
See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1994).
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 403(2)(b).
184. See Helms-Burton Act § 302(a) (1) (A), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 815 (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a) (1) (A)).
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 403(2)(b).
186. See Ann Davis, Helms-Burton's First Test Comes Soon, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 1, 1996, at A6
(reporting that lawyers are forming U.S. corporations for potential foreign plaintiffs from Spain
and Honduras so that non-U.S. nationals have ability to sue under Act).
187. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 403(2)(c) (explaining that "character of the
activity to be regulated" is a factor to be considered in analyzing reasonableness ofjurisdiction).
188. Some recent examples include U.S. commercial activity in Vietnam and Eastern Europe.
See Lowenfeld, supra note 83, at 231-32 (hypothesizing French version of Helms-Burton Act and
its impact on U.S. investments in Vietnam).
189. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 403(2) (d) (setting forth effect on expecta-
tions as relevant factor in determining propriety of exercising jurisdiction).
190. See id. § 402(a)-(b) (noting general rule that state may exercise jurisdiction over
conduct, persons, or things that either occur or exist within that state).
191. See id.
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for normal business conduct that is recognized as legal activity in their
home countries.1
92
(5) Regulation's importance to international political, legal, or economic
system' 93 The uniqueness of the measures in the Act,"9 the unilat-
eral aspects of its benefits, 95 and the negative reactions of foreign
governments' 96 suggest that the significance of the Act to the
international, legal, political, and economic order is minimal.
(6) Historical consistency:?97  Foreign governments have criticized
and Congress has admitted the uniqueness of the liability created by
the Act. 98
(7) Extent of another state's regulatory interests" and the likelihood of
conflict with another state's regulation?' The conduct that creates
liability under the Helms-Burton Act is conduct over which another
state may have reasonable territorial or national jurisdiction.20' If
the Act is interpreted broadly to apply to foreign companies' business
with Cuba, there is a high likelihood that a pre-existing regulatory
regime governs the transactions that the Act addresses. Given the
reaction in the 1980s to U.S. attempts to regulate companies
associated with a Russian pipeline project, it is reasonable to expect
that some of these foreign regulations will conflict with the require-
ments of the Act.2" 2 In fact, because of previous disputes over the
192. See Lowenfeld, supra note 83, at 431-32 (using U.S. investments in Vietnam as example
for measuring unreasonableness if France enacted law similar to Helms-Burton Act relating to
property in France).
193. See RESrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 403(2) (e) (indicating that international
importance of regulation should be used as a weighing fhctor in jurisdictional analysis).
194. SeeHelms-Burton Act, Pub. L No. 104-114, § 301(8), 1996 U.S.C.CA. N. (110 Stat.) 785,
814 (1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081(8)) (stating that international law does not
provide effective remedies like those created in Act); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-468, at 58 (1996)
(noting uniqueness of right of action), repfinted in 1996 U.S.C.GA.N. 558, 573.
195. The private causes of action created by this Act will benefit those plaintiffs who success-
fully litigate claims against"traffickers." SeeHelms-BurtonAct § 301(11), 1996 U.S.G.C.A.N. (110
Stat.) at 815 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081(11)).
196. See supra note 18 (discussing negative reactions of foreign governments to enactment
of Helms-Burton Act).
197. See REsrATE MENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 403(2) (f) (noting that consistency with
historical traditions is a factor to consider in analyzing jurisdiction).
198. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 58 (1996) ("[T]his right of action is a unique but
proportionate remedy for U.S. nationals."), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 558, 573.
199. SeeRESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 403(2) (g) (providing that interest of another
state in activity to be regulated should be considered in analysis ofjuridiciton).
200. See i&L § 403(2) (h) (observing that conflict with regulation of another state should be
weighed when analyzing proper exercise ofjurisdiction).
201. A reasonable exercise ofjurisdiction may be maintained by more than one state. See
i& § 403 cmt. d. The point here is to show that other states have solid grounds for employing
jurisdiction over the conduct regulated by Helms-Burton.
202. The unilateral sanctions imposed by then-President Ronald Reagan on companies that
helped the former Soviet Union build a natural gas pipeline received widespread criticism from
the United States' European allies. The sanctions were intended to punish Soviet repression in
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jurisdictional reach of U.S. laws, Canada currently has regulations that
prohibit Canadian companies from complying with U.S. extraterritori-
al laws.2 °3 When the Act is read in light of these previously enacted
Canadian regulations,2° a company based in Canada will be placed
in a catch-22: Canadian law prohibits what U.S. law now requires.05
b. Assessment of interest of other states
The existence of a Canadian statute that directly conflicts with the
Helms-Burton Act also is significant because international law
mandates an assessment of each state's interest when both regulate
Poland, but ended up creating division between the United States and Western Europe that led
to the eventual revocation of the regulations. The incident is known l'Affaire Gazoduc. See
generally HUFBAUER Er AL., supra note 143, at 205-20 (presenting its case study of pipeline
sanctions); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 267-306 (2d ed. 1983)
(recounting story of Reagan's pipeline regulations); Duane D. Morse & Joan S. Powers, U.S.
Export Controls & Foreign Entities: The Unanswered Questions of Pipeline Diplomacy, 23 VA. J. INT'L
L. 537, 538-44 (1983) (detailing history of pipeline regulation and European reaction); Homer
E. Moyer, Jr. & Linda A. Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The Histo"y, Legal
Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1 (1985) (explaining
United States' use of pipeline regulations in context of implementing export controls).
203. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, SOR/92-584, 1992 C. Gaz.
Part II, at 4048. This order was issued by the Canadian Attorney General in consultation with
the Secretary of State of External Affairs of Canada under the authority of the Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985). The legislation authorizes the attorney
general to prohibit or restrict the production of records to a foreign tribunal, see id. § 3(1), and
to issue orders that: (1) "require any person in Canada to give notice to" the attorney general
of such measures affecting international trade or commerce
of a kind or in a manner that has adversely affected or is likely to adversely affect
significant Canadian interests in relation to international trade or commerce involving
a business carried on in whole or in part in Canada or that otherwise has infringed or
is likely to infringe Canadian sovereignty;
or (2) "prohibit any person in Canada from complyingwith such measures." Id. §§ 3(1), 5. The
first order relating to the United States was issued in 1990 in anticipation of the passage of the
Cuban Democracy Act. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, SOR/90-
751, 1990 C. Gaz. Part H, at 4918. When the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 was passed, another
order was issued by the Canadian attorney general. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures
(United States) Order, SOR/92-584, 1992 C. Gaz. Part II, at 4048; see also Canadian Issues Order
Blocking Cuban Democracy Act Expansion, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1759 (1992) (reporting
blocking order issued in reaction to anti-Cuba sanction law). This order recently was amended
to leave no doubt that it may be applied in the context of the Helms-Burton Act. See Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, SOR/96-84, 1996 C. Gaz. Part 1, at 611. See
generallyFairley, supranote 152, at 31-33 (discussing Canadian blocking legislation); Keith Highet
et al., International Decisions, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 532 (1994) (reporting decision of Canadian
Supreme Court in Hunt v. Lac d'Amiante that discussed constitutionality of provincial version of
blocking statute); Selma M. Lussenburg, The Collision of Canadian and U.S. Sovereignty in the Area
of Export Controls, 20 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 145, 147-153 (1994) (discussing history and applications of
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act).
204. The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order was issued October 9,
1992, and amendedJanuary 12, 1996, as compared to enactment of the Helms-Burton Act on
March 12, 1996. Compare Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, SOR/92-5
84, 1992 C. Gaz. Part II, at 4048, with supra note 10 (chronicling enactment of Helms-Burton
Act).
205. See supra note 203 (presenting Canadian order that forbids Canadian companies'
compliance with U.S. extraterritorial laws).
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the same conduct.2°6  Therefore, even if the Act's extraterritorial
application is determined to be reasonable, the law must be examined
in light of the interests of other relevant nations in order to deter-
mine jurisdiction. This assessment is based on the reasonableness
factors discussed above. 2 7  A consideration of interests must recog-
nize that the activity at issue in the Act may: (1) take place in
Canada; (2) involve Canadian nationals; and (3) entail conduct
traditionally regulated by Canada. Further, because the Canadian
regulation is more consistent with the established norms ofjurisdic-
tion,0 8 it appears that Canada will be able to claim a greater
interest in exercising jurisdiction.
B. Violations of International Agreements
The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") 219 is a
congressional-executive agreement. 210  As a source of international
law implemented in the United States by domestic legislation, 1
NAFTA obligates the United States in its relations with other nations.
206. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 403 cmt. e (proposing interest analysis when
two or more states having conflicting regulations exercise jurisdiction). For purposes of this
principle, there must be more than a mere difference in priorities and policies; there must be
an actual conflict. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993) (citing
Restatement (Third) to stress that there is no conflict when company is able to comply with laws
of both regulating states).
207. Seesupra Part 11A.3.a (describing limitations onjurisdiction imposed by reasonableness);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 403(3) (maintaining that exercise of jurisdiction by
multiple states having conflicting regulations is guided by reasonableness analysis).
208. In the example given, Canada can claim jurisdiction based on territoriality and
nationality, the "principal bases ofjurisdiction to prescribe." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
4, at 237 introductory note; see also supra note 158 (defiming territoriality and nationality
principles).
209. NAFTA, supra note 19.
210. SeeAckerman & Golove, supranote 50, at 802-03 & n.6 (discussing NAFIA as congressio-
nal-executive agreement because it was subject to ex post review by Congress); Yong K Kim, The
Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the International Trade System Despite U.S. Constitutional Constraints,
17 MICH.J. INT'L L. 967, 996 (1996) ("Fast track [which was used in NAFTA passage] is a type
of executive agreement known as a congressional-executive agreement."); Harold H. Koh, Fast
Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143 (1992) (discussing history of
NAFTA negotiation process); Samuel C. Straight, Note, GATT and NAFTA: Marying Effective
Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifly States, 45 DuKE LJ. 216, 247-48 (1995) (discussing
NAIFTA in U.S. law). For further discussion of congressional-executive agreements, see supra
Part IA.2.a. NAFTA was negotiated on a "fast track" basis by the executive branch pursuant to
the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2111-2112,2191-2193 (1994), and the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2902. This framework requires that the President
involve Congress in the negotiating process. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2092(c)-(d), 2211(a)(1),
2903(a) (1) (A); see also Ackerman & Golove, supra note 50, at 904-07 (describing negotiations
of international trade agreements under Trade Act regime). NAFTA then was approved by
Congress in the North American Free Trade Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 101,
107 Stat. 2057, 2061-62 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (1994)) [hereinafter NAFrA
Implemerltation Act].
211., SeeNAFrA Implementation Act, 107 Stat. 2057 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 19,
22, 26, 28, 46 U.S.C.).
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When domestic legislation impinges on the obligations set forth in
NAFTA, contracting parties 12 may challenge the legislation under
NAFTA's dispute resolution processes. 213  Some parties already have
initiated these mechanisms to challenge Titles III and IV of the
Helms-Burton Act.2 14  Whether the Act violates NAFTA ultimately
will be determined by the appropriate panels created by that agree-
ment.215  However, U.S. courts also must consider how the Helms-
Burton Act affects U.S. obligations under NAFTA.216
One argument that the Act violates U.S. obligations under NAFTA
concerns Article 1105 of NAFTA 17 Entitled the "Minimum Stan-
dard Treatment," this article requires that each NAFTA party treat
212. United States, Mexico, and Canada are the contracting parties to NAFTA. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 3311(a) (1).
213. NAFTA Article 2004 states, in pertinent part, that "the dispute settlement provisions of
this Chapter shall apply ... wherever a Party considers that an actual or proposed measure of
another Party is or would be inconsistent with the obligations of this Agreement .... " The
dispute settlement provisions to which this article refers include Articles 2005-2022. SeeNAFTA
supra note 19, arts. 2005-2022.
214. On June 28, 1996, Mexico, Canada, and the United States held consultations as
provided for under Chapter 20 of NAFTA. See NAFIA Designates Confer on Complaint Against
Helms-Burton Under Chapter 20, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1093, 1093 (July 3, 1996) (reporting
teleconference between designates of trade ministers from each country). This mechanism is
the first step in the formation of a NAFrA panel. See NAFrA, supra note 19, art. 2006.
Although Canada and Mexico were able to request the formation ofa NAFTA dispute resolution
panel after 30 days of the consultations, see id. art. 2008, neither country had exercised that
authority as of the publication of this Comment. Canada recently decided to postpone
requesting the formation of such a panel until the EU, which is negotiating with the United
States in order to avoid the appointment of a dispute panel by the WTO, has completed those
negotiations. See Canada Delays NAFTA Helms-Burton Case Pending EU Negotiations with United
States, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 307, 307 (Feb. 19, 1997) (quoting Canadian International
Trade Minister Art Eggleton about Canadian decision).
215. If consultation between the parties fails, any party may request a meeting of the Free
Trade Commission. See NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 2001 (establishing Free Trade Commission);
id. art. 2007 (empowering parties to request meeting of commission). A party then may request
that an arbitral body be empaneled. See id. art. 2008. Following the rules of procedure set forth
in NAFrA, the panelists will issue an initial report and then a final report. See id. art. 2012
(providing rules of procedure for arbitral panel); id. art. 2016 (describing arbitral panel's initial
report); id. art. 2017 (describing arbitral panel's final report). The disputing parties then must
implement the final report. See id. art. 2018; see also id. art. 2019 (allowing suspension of benefits
upon non-implementation of final report).
216. See supra Part 1A2.b (discussing impact of international agreements on domestic
legislation). In dicta, one court refused to recognize NAFTA's impact on domestic law. See
Mississippi Poultry Ass'n, Inc. v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 303 (5th Cir. 1994) ("NAFTA... is not
meant to affect United States law other than as 'specifically provided.'" (quoting NAFTA
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057, 2062 (1993))). Courts also may have
to consider the Helms-Burton Act in relation to GATT. For a discussion of the Act in the
context of GATr, see Jonathan R. Ratchik, Comment, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
of 1995, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 343, 351-57 (1996).
217. SeeKenneth L. Bachman etal., Anti-Cuba Sanctions May ViolateNAFTA, GAT, NAT'L LJ.,
Mar. 11, 1996, at C3 (stating that additional arguments concerning Tide III's violation of trade
obligations are "not as strong" as argument under NAFTA Article 1105). The main concern
over Title III is its apparent violation of NAFTA Article 1005 and not necessarily any violations
of other trade obligations. See id.; Fairley, supra note 152, at 39 (calling NAFTA, supra note 19,
art. 1105, a "particularly promising" challenge to Helms-Burton Act).
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"investments of investors of another Party ... in accordance with
international law."2 8 NAFTA's definition of investments is broad
enough to encompass the property held by businesses that are
nationals of NAFTA countries.219  Therefore, if the Helms-Burton
Act violates international customary law, it also violates Article 1105
of NAFA.2
20
Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act also may interfere with NAFTA's
guarantee to facilitate temporary entry of business persons who are
citizens of one NAFTA country into another NAFTA country.
2 1
Each NAFTA Party guarantees temporary entry for business persons
engaging in business activity as long as that person complies with
"existing immigration measures."222 "Existing," as between Canada
and Mexico or the United States and Mexico, is defined as in effect
when the agreement entered into force,223 and as between Canada
and the United States, means as ofJanuary 1, 1989.224 Because Title
IV of the Helms-Burton Act restricts the travel of business persons
even if they are engaging in business activity,21 and because this
restriction was not an existing immigration measure,226 one could
argue that Title IV violates NAFTA's guarantee of temporary entry for
business persons.
C. Implication of International Law Violations on
Domestic Implementation
The preceding discussion presented the strongest arguments that
the Helms-Burton Act violates international law. Because internation-
al law may be used to shape the construction of domestic legisla-
218. NAFrA, supra note 19, art. 1105.
219. The definition extends to any "investment owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
an investor of such Party." NAFrA, supra note 19, art. 1139; see also Bachman et aL, supra note
217, at C,; Fairley, supra note 152, at 38-39.
220. See supra Part IIA (discussing possible violations of international customary law).
221. See NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1603(1); see alsoBachman, supra note 217, at C3 (suggest-
ing Helms-Burton Act's possible violation of this NAFTA provision).
222. NAFIA Implementation Act, supra note 210, annex 1603 § A(I).
223. See id. annex 1608 (a). The agreement went into force onJanuary 1,1994. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 3311(b) (1994).
224. See id. annex 1608(b).
225. SeeHelms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 401(a), 1996 U.S.C.CJ.N. (110 Stat.) 785,
822 (1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6091(a)).
226. The measures in Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act became effective immediately upon
enactment of the Act on March 12, 1996, after the dates defining "existing" in NAFrA. See
Helms-Burton Act § 401(d), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 824 (to be codified at § 6091 (d)).
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tion,227 U.S. courts may be required to interpret the Act in light of
these potential violations.
To analyze the construction problems domestic courts may face and
to test the outer limits of the Act's reach, this Comment hypothesizes
one potential kind of defendant. This defendant is a domestic
company (America Inc.) that allegedly is liable to a U.S. national
because the domestic company's foreign parent, a Canadian corpora-
tion (Canada Corp.), has "trafficked" in property confiscated in Cuba.
Assuming all other requirements of the Act are met and that America
Inc. has not benefitted from the alleged trafficking, a court may have
to address questions concerning the significance of international law
violations in the Act if America Inc. asks the court to dismiss the claim
by ruling that the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action.
228
America Inc. would argue that the Act should be construed so as not
to cover conduct by Canada Corp., because a presumption arises
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law, and international law
does not support Congress' prescriptive jurisdiction.229 Courts faced
with this challenge may choose to respond in one of the following
ways:
(1) The Helms-Burton Act does not violate international aw. Courts may
rule that the Helms-Burton Act does not violate international law by
making America Inc. liable to U.S. nationals for trafficking by the
foreign parent, Canada Corp. Because of growing trade between
foreign companies and Cuba, this holding, representing aggressive
implementation of the Helms-Burton Act, would impact numerous
foreign companies with U.S. subsidiaries even if those companies were
able to prove that their U.S. concerns received no benefit from the
parent's trafficking. ,
In order to justify this broad implementation of the Act, a court
could rely on various rationales. First, it could respond to all of the
arguments claiming that the Act violates international law,2"' includ-
ing the Act's direct conflict with the law of another country.2 31 This
227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 111 (stating that international law and
international agreements are law of the United States); id. §§ 113-114 (describing impact of
international law on domestic courts); see also Parts 1A.1 and IA.2.b (discussing impact of
international law on construction of U.S. statutes).
228. See FED. R. Civ. PRO. 12(b) (6); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,
813-14 (1993) (Scalia,J., dissenting in part) (distinguishing between dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and dismissal for lack of authority).
229. See Hartford Fire, 506 U.S. at 814-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
230. See supra Part II (presenting arguments that Helms-Burton Act violates international
law).
231. See supra note 203 (describing Canadian law prohibiting compliance with Helms-Burton
Act); see also Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99 (ruling that no true conflict exists between U.S. and
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reasoning may stress that the Helms-Burton Act covers activities that
have a substantial effect in the United States and that the exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction is reasonable. 232 A court also may find that
the Act is within Congress'jurisdictional authority because it regulates
activity that endangers U.S. national security.213  Second, a court
may decide that a ruling on the international law aspect of the Act is
not within its competence given the ambiguity of the relevant
international law principles.2 s  This reasoning could rely on
Congress' discussion of the Act's international law ramifications
during its consideration of the Act and defer to Congress' assertions
that the Act is consistent with international law.235
This holding would not contradict the Charming Betsy principle. As
a mode of statutory construction, this principle disfavors interpreta-
tions of statutes that contravene international law. 6 In finding no
incompatibility between the Helms-Burton Act and international law,
the court simply could determine that Charming Betsy does not apply.
(2) Despite possible violations of international law, later-in-time domestic
statutes trump international law obligations. Courts may favor this
holding because it allows them to avoid examining questions of
international law. The later-in-time principle states that current
British law when person can comply with laws from both states); Fairley, supra note 152, at 30-33(distinguishing facts in HartfordFirefrom those likely to be found in cases brought under Helms-
Burton Act).
232. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act: Hearings on S.381 Before the Subcomm. on
Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. 136
(1995) (prepared statement of Ignacio E. Sanchez) (arguing that Act is reasonable exercise ofjurisdiction based on factors in Restatement (Third) because Act helps United States protect its
nationals' property rights); Clagett, supra note 104, at 436-38 (contending that Act is reasonable
exercise of jurisdiction). The substantial effects argument appears to be the basis on which
Congress assumed its jurisdiction. See Helms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 301(9), 1996
U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) 785,815 (1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081(9)) ("International
law recognizes that a nation has the ability to provide for rules of law with respect to conduct
outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.")
233. See Clagett, supra note 104, at 435-36 (stressing danger to U.S. national security because
of proximity of Cuba to United States).
234. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing application of international law to
Act).
235. See House Markup, supra note 98, at 56 (statement of Rep. Menendez) ("There is no one
who can come to that microphone and say that there is international law that in fact stops us
from pursuing such a cause of action [in Title III] on behalf of U.S. citizens and U.S.
companies."); 142 CONG. REC. H1737 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1996) (statement of Rep. Burton)
("International law and comity were not conceived to protect the corporate scavengers who are
profiting at the expense of the Cuban people, pilfering the purloined assets of American
citizens, and propping up a bandit regime."); id. at S1481 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Coverdell) ("This bill violates no treaty or international convention. It does not violate
customary international law.").
236. See supra notes 38-44 and 74-81 and accompanying text (defining and discussing
Charming Betsy principle).
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legislation supersedes any previous international legal obligation.237
Because Congress has the authority to override international law,2
courts reason that there is no need to ask whether Congress has, in
fact, done so. Instead, courts stress the judiciary's role in enforcing
the laws as passed and understood by Congress. The Federal Circuit
recently took this approach in responding to the argument that
provisions of national legislation should be interpreted consistently
with U.S. obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") .29 The court ruled:
[W]e are bound not by what we think Congress should or perhaps
wanted to do, but by what Congress in fact did. The GATT does
not trump domestic legislation; if the statutory provisions at issue
here are inconsistent with the GATr, it is a matter for Congress
and not this court to decide and remedy.2'
Otherwise stated, courts must give full effect to Congress' intent.
It may be argued that Congress clearly intended to apply the
Helms-Burton Act broadly.24 1 Because U.S. companies already are
237. The later-in-time doctrine explicitly recognizes Congress' authority to violate
international norms. See supra notes 35, 36 and 44 (discussing authority of Congress to
contravene international norms). The Restatement (Third) states that:
An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an
international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to
supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or
provision cannot be fairly reconciled.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 115(1) (a).
As stated in the passage quoted above, the later-in-time doctrine requires that the statute and
international law irreconcilably conflict. Therefore, an argument against holding that a
subsequent domestic statute automatically overrides international obligations is that such a per
se rule fails to determine whether the two indeed are irreconcilable. For a general discussion
of this doctrine, see Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudenie 44
HASTINGS LJ. 185, 226-31 (1993).
238. See, eg., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,745 (1986) (holding that treaty with Indian
tribe was abrogated by Eagle Protection Act); Chae Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 599-602
(1899) (The Chinese Exclusion Cases) (holding that statute passed after treaty prevails); Edye
v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 600 (1884) (The Head Money Cases) (ruling that later Act of
Congress prevails over conflicting international obligation); Suramerica de Aleaciones
Laminadas, CA v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (ruling that domestic
statute passed after GATT is controlling even when this statute conflicts with GATT); South
African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that Congress has power
to enact legislation that conflicts with prior treaty obligation); United States v. Georgescu, 723
F. Supp. 912, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (referring directly to later-in-time doctrine to reject interpre-
tation of international convention).
239. See Aleadones Laminadas, 966 F.2d at 667-68.
240. Id.
241. There is ample evidence that Title III of the Helms-Burton Act has been understood
to grant nothing less than the right to sue foreign companies. Legislators have not doubted the
reach of Title IIl. For example, the conference report accompanying the Act states:
The purpose of [the Act's] civil remedy is, in part, to discourage persons and
companies from engaging in commercial transactions involving confiscated property,
and in so doing to deny the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro the capital generated by
such ventures and to deter the exploitation of property confiscated from U.S. nationals.
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prohibited by the Cuban Democracy Act from engaging in commer-
cial activities with Cuba,4 interpreting the Act to outlaw what
already is illegal would render Titles III and IV of the Act useless.
The provisions in these titles are intended to "discourage third-
country nationals from seeking to profit from illegally confiscated
property."2' Narrow construction would undermine these inten-
tions.
(3) The Act must be construed narrowly so as not to violate US. obligations
under international law. A narrow construction of the Act would limit
its application to U.S. companies. The court could base this
limitation on the presumption against extraterritoriality that presumes
that legislation is meant to apply only within the United States.
244
To overcome this presumption, the proponent of extraterritorial
application must make an affirmative showing that Congress manifest-
ed clear intent to give the legislation extraterritorial effect.245 A
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 58 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 558, 573; see also 142
CONG. REc. H1726 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1996) (statement of Rep. Diaz-Balart) (criticizing bill for
granting to select few the right to sue foreign companies); id. at S1484 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Coverdell) (describing bill as permitting "lawsuits in American courts against
Canadian, Mexican, European and other foreign companies").
Furthermore, certain sections of the Act may be unintelligible ifTitle III does not refer to the
regulation of foreign companies. See, e.g., Helms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 108, 1996
U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) 785, 798-99 (1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6083) (requiring
reports on commerce with Cuba from other foreign countries); id. § 301(5), 1996 U.S.C.CAN.
(110 Stat.) at 814 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081(5)) (making finding related to
opportunities for foreign investors in Cuba); id. § 301(10), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 815
(to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081(10)) (stating U.S. obligation to protect its citizens from
wrongful confiscations by foreign nations and their citizens); id. § 303(a) (3), 1996 U.S.C.CAN.
(110 Stat.) at 820 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6083(a)(3)) (concerning effect of determina-
tions of foreign entities). The broad application of Title III also is at the root of the
international controversy over the Act. See supra notes 202-05 (discussing international reaction
to Act). Despite the belief that the Act applies to foreign companies, the term "foreign
companies" is not specifically mentioned in the Act itself or in any of the committee reports.
See infra notes 244-61 and accompanying text (arguing that Act does not apply to foreign
companies).
242. See 22 U.S.C. § 6001 (1994) (providing sanctions for engaging in prohibited transac-
tions).
243. H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 25 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 527, 530.
244. SeeHartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,814-15 (1993) (Scalia,J., dissenting
in part) (describing presumption against extraterritoriality as traditional canon of statutory
construction); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 249 (1991) (commonly known as
Aramco) (using presumption against extraterritoriality to construe narrowly Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as not applying to employment practices of U.S. firms employing U.S. citizens
abroad); Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Societe Generale, 93 F.3d 1036, 1047 (1996) (noting
that overcoming presumption against extraterritoriality "requires a clear expression from
Congress for a statute to reach non-domestic conduct"). This presumption originated in Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Flardo, 336 U.S. 281,285 (1949). For comprehensive treatment ofthe presumption
against extraterritoriality, see Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598 (1990).
245. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. The presumption against extraterritorial application of
domestic legislation has been overcome in relation to antitrust statutes. See Hartford Fire 509
U.S. at 814 (Scalia,J., dissenting in part) (describing as "well established" precedent concerning
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U.S. national bringing a case under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act
may argue that this clear intent is present not only in the legislative
history of the ActF1 but also in the language of the Act itself. The
conduct that would precipitate a valid claim under this title, what is
called "trafficking," is defined broadly to capture a wide range of
commercial activity in relation to confiscated property.247 Further-
more, liability for this conduct is imposed on "any person."
248 If
"any person" is liable, certainly, according to this argument, a foreign
person is liable.
Despite the sound logic of this plain meaning interpretation of the
statute, it is precisely this kind of broad boilerplate language that the
Supreme Court has deemed insufficient to overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality.249 Although courts may have difficulty
limiting the conduct that is covered by the Act in light of the statute's
language," they may limit who may be held liable for such con-
duct. Title I of the Act makes any person that engages in the
specified conduct liable to a U.S. national for that conduct2 51  In
turn, "person" for the purposes of the Act already has been defined
as "any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state."252  This same kind of language was limited in
extraterritorial application ofSherman Act); see also supranotes 160-63 (discussing extraterritorial
application of antitrust legislation in relation to substantial effects doctrine).
Courts have applied the presumption against extraterritoriality selectively, depending on the
context of the legislation. SeeTurley, supra note 237, at 222-23 (discussing selective application
in context of antitrust, securities, employment, and environmental law). An interesting question
for the court would be whether the presumption also is overcome in the context of international
sanction law legislation that often would have little effect if not applied extraterritorially. See
supra notes 24143 and accompanying text (discussing how Helms-Burton Act would be rendered
useless by limiting its coverage to U.S. companies).
246. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text (presenting evidence from legislative
history of Congress' clear intent to apply Act extraterritorially).
247. SeeHelms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 4(13), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) 785,
790-91 (1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)); see also supra note 12 (reproducing
statute's definition of "trafficking" for purposes of Title III).
248. See Helms-Burton Act § 302(a) (1), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 815 (to be codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a) (1)); see also supra note 11 (reproducing statute's definition of "person").
249. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 249 (rejecting party's reliance on Title VII's broad boilerplate
language extending its application to commerce "between a State and any place outside thereof"
because language is overbroad); New York Cent. &R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925)
(refusing to extend extraterritorial effect to law even though language implicated commerce
between "any of the States or territories and any foreign nation or nations"). But see Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952) (granting broad extraterritorial jurisdiction to
Lanham Act that covered "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress"); Turley,
supra note 237, at 222-23 (discussing extraterritorial application of laws in various contexts).
250. "Trafficking" is defined meticulously. See supra note 12 (reproducing Act's definition
of"trafficking").
251. Helms Burton Act § 302(a) (1), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 815 (to be codified at
22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)).
252. Id. § 4(11), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 790 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6023(11)). The Act defines "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" the same way as the
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Lauritzen v. Larsen."5 In construing the "any seaman" language in
the Jones Act to mean "any U.S. seaman," Justice Jackson stated for
the majority:
Unless some relationship ... to our national interest is implied,
Congress has extended our law and opened our courts to all alien
seafaring men injured anywhere in the world in service of water-
craft of every foreign nation-a hand on a Chinese junk, never
outside Chinese waters, would not be beyond its literal working. 4
Similarly, it may be argued that "any person" in the Helms-Burton Act
means any U.S. person.255
Other textual elements in the Act support this narrow construction.
For example, the activity of foreign companies is not addressed
specifically in either the Act or the legislative history. The term
"foreign national" is defined in the Act25 and would include foreign
companies.257  Nevertheless, this term is not incorporated in the
definition of "any person,"21 nor does it appear in Title III of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See id. § 4(1), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 789 (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6023(1)) (cross-referencing to definition in Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1994)).
253. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
254. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953). It is important to note that Lauritzen is
not a presumption-against-extraterritoriality case; rather, the authorityfor its narrow construction
was based on the conceptually and historically related Charming Betsy principle. The close
relationship between the two concepts has caused the Supreme Court to use cases utilizing one
principle to support the use of the other. For example, Charming Betsy cases were cited as
support for the majority's opinion in Aramco. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (citing Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949) and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros, 372 U.S. 10 (1963)); i&t at 264 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out majority's
reliance on CharmingBetsy principle for ruling on presumption against extraterritoriality); see also
infra note 262 (discussing relationship between CharmingBetsy principle and presumption against
extraterritoriality).
255. In part, the presumption against extraterritoriality is based on potential conflicts
between U.S. law and laws of foreign nations. SeeAramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (stating that presump-
tion "serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations
which could result in international discord"). The direct conflict between extraterritorial
application of the Helms-Burton Act and the laws of other nations, especially those of Canada,
would support the application of this presumption. Seesupranotes 203-05 (discussing Canadian
law that prevents Canadian companies from complying with U.S. extraterritorial laws).
256. Section 4(8) of the Act states:
The term "foreign national" means-
(A) an alien; or
(B) any corporation, trust, partnership, or other juridical entity not organized
under the laws of the United States, or of any State, the District of Columbia, or any
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
Helms-Burton Act § 4(8), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) at 790 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6023(8)).
257. See i&t § 4(8)(B), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 790 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6023(8) (B)).
258. Id § 4(11), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 790 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6023(11)).
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Act.259 Rather, the conduct of foreign nationals is referenced only
in the context of written reports concerning commerce with and
assistance to Cuba."6 It may be argued that this specific definition
of "foreign nationals" excludes them from the general definition of
"any person." Also, the recognition of a special category called
"foreign nationals" illustrates how Congress could have been more
specific in Title III if it had intended to do so. 261  By failing to
include "foreign nationals" among those liable for trafficking,
Congress did not express its intent to hold foreign companies liable
for their extraterritorial conduct.
By finding that the presumption against extraterritoriality has not
been overcome, the court also would honor the Charming Betsy
principle. 22  Because many of the inconsistencies between the Act
259. See id. §§ 301-306, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 814-22 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6081-6085).
260. See id. § 108, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) at 798-99 (to be codified at 22 U.S.c.
§ 6038). "Foreign nationals" appears only twice in the entire Act, once in § 108(b) (3) and once
in § 108(b) (6).
261. Recognition that Congress knows how to employ the language ofextraterritoriality when
it intends extraterritorial application of domestic legislation is part of the reasoning behind the
Court's use of the presumption against extraterritoriality. SeeEEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244,258 (1991) ("Congress' awareness of the need to make a clear statement that a statute
applies overseas is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions on which it has expressly
legislated the extraterritorial application of a statute."). In Aranwo the Court cites numerous
statutes illustrating clear statutory language indicating extraterritorial application of laws. See id.
Among others, it cites the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2451(2) (1988),
which defines a U.S. person as "any domestic concern (including any permanent domestic
establishment of any foreign concern) and any foreign subsidiary or affiliate (including any
permanent foreign establishment) of any domestic concern which is controlled in fact by such
domestic concern," and the Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1988), which statutorily applies to
"[a]ny citizen ... wherever he may be." See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258.
262. The presumption against extraterritoriality and the Charming Betsy principle are closely
related. See Turley, supra note 237, at 190 (recognizing common origins of the two forms of
statutory construction); Jonathan Turley, Transnational Discrimination and the Economics of
Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U. L. Rav. 339, 345 n.30 (1990) (stating that distinction between
two principles "only obscures prescriptive origins of the presumption"); James Mathieu, Note,
The Supreme Court "s Not So Clear Statement in: Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 21 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 939, 939 (1996) (tracing history of presumption against
extraterritoriality to CharmingBesy principle). Nevertheless, courts have attempted to distinguish
them. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-15 (1993) (ScaliaJ., dissenting
in part) (discussing both principles as distinct forms of statutory construction); EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 264 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (declaring Charming Betsy
principle "wholly independent rule of construction" from presumption against extraterritoriali-
ty); Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 857 F.2d 1014, 1023 (5th Cir. 1988) (King, J., dissenting) (arguing
that presumption against extraterritoriality requires less stringent showing of legislative intent
than does Charming Betsy principle), af/'d on reh'g en bane, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'd sub
nom. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). For a comprehensive treatment of the
presumption against territoriality and the Charming Betsy principle (referred to as the
presumption in favor of international law), see Turley, supra note 237, at 210-224. In part
Professor Turley states that the presumption against extraterritoriality "was created by the direct
application of an international source in the form of the customary international law on
prescriptivejurisdiction." Id. at 231. In other words, the presumption against extraterritoriality
may be considered a sub-class of the Charming Betsy principle c6ncerned with international
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and international law relate to jurisdictional questions, 263 and
because the presumption against extraterritoriality resolves these
questions in favor of limited, national jurisdiction, there no longer
would be an inconsistency between international law and a domestic
statute requiring reconciliation under the Charming Betsy princi-
ple.2 4 In other words, many of the arguments that the Act violates
international law would be moot if Title III of the Act is limited to
conduct by U.S. nationals.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS: METHODS OF RECONCILING CONFLICTS
BETWEEN DOMESTIC STATUTES AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
Enforcers of the Helms-Burton Act may avoid domestic judicial
scrutiny of the Act's potential violation of international law.2
Nevertheless, reconciling aggressive sanction legislation with interna-
tional law will continue to present courts with the difficult choice of
either undermining congressional intent or abandoning the Charming
Betsy principle. To avoid this unnecessarily risky form of lawmaking,
Congress must harness its vast powers either to define U.S. interna-
tional obligations21 such that they do not conflict with other
legislative objectives, or to formulate domestic legislation that accords
with pre-existing obligations. The following recommendations offer
a sampling of congressional action that should be taken.
A. Presidential Suspension Authority
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act provides the executive with
authority to suspend some aspects of the Act after certain determina-
tions have been made.267 This authority is helpful because it gives
the executive discretionary power to balance the provisions of the law
with other foreign relations concerns. Congress may, as in this case,
attempt to define narrowly the determinations required under the
Act. Any language other than factual requirements, however, will
lend itself to varying interpretations depending on legal and policy
norms ofjurisdiction.
263. See supra notes 158-208 and accompanying text (discussing Act's potential violations of
international law based on jurisdictional issues).
264. For general treatment of the Charming Betsy principle, see supra notes 38-44 and 74-81
and accompanying text.
265. See supra Part II.C (presenting arguments that Act does not violate international law).
266. See supra Part 1A2 (discussing congressional power to define U.S. international obliga-
tions).
267. SeeHelms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, §§ 306(b)-(d), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.)
785, 821-22 (1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6085(b)-(d)); see also supra note 134 and
accompanying text (describing workings of presidential suspension authority).
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needs. This flexibility will permit the executive to raise potential
violations of international law as justifications for avoiding implemen-
tation of certain statutory provisions.
B. Suspension Authority Based on International Law Determinations
Suspension may be linked to determinations or rulings of bodies
other than the executive. This approach has been used with some
export control laws2"a and is the best way to ensure U.S. compliance
with international law. One export control law includes a provision
that mandates suspension of any part of the statute that is found to
violate U.S. obligations under international trade agreements. 69 A
determination by the body authorized under the applicable interna-
tional agreement that a violation has occurred triggers this suspension
provision.27 This approach pays fall respect to the international
agreement by linking domestic legislation to determinations by the
authorized international body that such legislation does not infringe
international law. The disadvantage is that national bodies relinquish
control of and accountability for domestic legislation when the validity
of such legislation is decided by international bodies.
71
C. Comprehensive Sanction Legislation
Because U.S. sanction laws often are the source of international
condemnation and legal challenges, Congress may avoid the legal
268. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 620c(g) (1994) (defining suspension authority when U.S. law
violates trade agreement).
269. See id. The statute states:
The President is authorized... to suspend the provisions of this action if a panel of
experts has reported to the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, or a ruling issued under the formal dispute settlement proceeding provided
under any other trade agreement finds, that the provisions of this section are in
violation of, or inconsistent with, United States obligations under that trade agreement.
270. See id.
271. The extent of this disadvantage is mitigated by Congress' power to effect the content
of international agreements and the obligations they entail. See supra Part IA2 (discussing
congressional ability to determine content of international agreement). In addition,
determinations by international bodies concerning issues in international agreements or
international law, in general, already can have an effect on domestic legislation. See supra Part
I.A.1 (discussing Charming Betsy principle). But see Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, CA.
v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 667 (1992) (concluding that GATT was not controlling authority
when it conflicted with domestic statute). Nevertheless, given the broad standards in many
international agreements and the malleable nature of language, there always will be some
unpredictability concerning the precise scope of certain obligations and the meaning of certain
commitments. By linking domestic legislation to determinations by the proper international
bodies, Congress authorizes these bodies to "veto" certain provisions in legislation that are
construed to violate international obligations in the same way that the Constitution authorizes
the courts, through judicial review, to "veto" statutory provisions that violate federal constitu-
tional obligations.
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problems associated with laws such as the Helms-Burton Act by
enacting a comprehensive international sanction law. Such an act
should create a continuum of increasing export controls and other
sanction techniques.272 The law would require presidential determi-
nations or congressional findings to trigger imposition of higher or
lower levels of sanctions. This approach would avoid the case-by-case
initiatives that often involve raw, election year politics and short-term,
ideological goals. More importantly, an international sanction act
could define the specific national interests underlying sanctions that
might be challenged under international law. The debate over such
national interests would allow Congress to define exactly when it is
ready to breach international law in pursuit of national goals and
what level of deference courts should extend to international legal
principles in this inquiry.
D. Clear Intent to Violate International Law
Congress also can use its legislative authority to express its clear
intent to enforce a statute even though the statute may violate
international law. In applying domestic law, courts consistently have
recognized Congress' power to violate international norms.25 By
expressly stating an intent to violate international law, Congress will
prevent domestic courts from construing legislation narrowly. Statutes
that expressly flout international law, however, may set a dangerous
international precedent. In general, countries do not wish to be
perceived as outside the international legal system. Furthermore, the
United States would not want to undermine a system from which it
benefits.
E. Congressional Authority to Affect Obligations Under International Law
Congress has the ability to define the obligations the United States
assumes under international agreements. 274 Therefore, it may wish
simply to assert this power to formulate international agreements with
which the United States can comply. Congress, for example, could
have demanded safeguards in NAFTA and GATT that allow interna-
tional sanctions even though they may violate international law.
Those demands could have been addressed either in the statute
272. SeeAnne Q. Connaughton, Exporting to SpecialDestinations: Terrorist-SupportingEmbargoed
Countries, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS: 1995, at 447, 544-48 (Evan R. Berlach &
Cecil Hunt eds., 1995) (illustrating categories of exported items that may be restricted).
273. See Goldidang, supra note 36, at 144 (stating that courts long have held that domestic
legislation prevails over international law).
274. See supra Part I.A.2 (describing congressional power).
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authorizing the negotiation of these agreements, through pressure on
the administration during the negotiations, or by refusal to adopt the
final agreement. The advantage of this approach is that it preserves
the integrity of the United States' commitment to international
agreements. The disadvantage is that it may result in stalled talks and
derailed negotiations of complex and significant international
agreements.
CONCLUSION
The globalization of commerce has resulted in a closer
relationship between international and domestic legal systems.
Standard domestic commercial statutes of yesteryear have become far-
reaching international trade legislation of today. As a result, domestic
statutes increasingly will have international law ramifications. This
situation is evident particularly in the context of foreign policy
sanctions legislation, which, by definition, has international implica-
tions. In the United States, lawmakers must understand the conse-
quences of enacting legislation that impinges on international legal
obligations. Courts may use the Charming Betsy principle and related
rules of statutory construction to construe narrowly such statutes so
as to reconcile them with international law.
The Helms-Burton Act provides a good example of a foreign policy
sanction law that may have its purpose undermined by thejudiciary's
interpretive rules. The questions surrounding its domestic application
presage potential problems of judicial interpretation in the world of
overlapping legal guidelines. The Act appears to have no purpose
without extraterritorial application, but it is textually ambiguous.
Thus, courts interpreting the Helms-Burton Act will be caught
between the rules of statutory construction that favor narrow
interpretation and the apparent, but unclear, congressional intent
that suggests broad application of the Act.
Although violation of international law comes at a cost, Congress
has the domestic authority to decide to pay that price in exchange for
what it determines to be important national priorities. Absent clear
congressional intent, however, courts may undermine those priorities.
The courts may not have an interpretive role in applying the Helms-
Burton Act, because certain provisions never may become effective.
However, courts increasingly will face the problems the Act raises.
Congress has the legal authority to avoid these problems. Congress
also has the legal responsibility to adhere to the international
obligations it created.
13351997]

